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INTRODUCTION
Children are no strangers to the courtroom, although courtrooms must certainly
be strange to them. Not only are the courtroom trappings formal and intimidating,
but, in the words of one youngster, "some of the grownups aren't nice." Outside the
legal arena, children's interaction with adults is largely positive. Teachers, doctors,
therapists, coaches, and others are supportive and concerned. In court, by contrast,
at least one adult-the defense attorney-may be incredulous of everything the child
says, portraying the child as incompetent, coached, or confused. Many observers
believe the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom undermines some children's
capacity to provide accurate testimony' and inflicts unnecessary anxiety.2
The 1980s witnessed a significant increase in the prosecution of child abuse,
particularly sexual abuse.3 As more and more children took the long walk to the
witness stand, prosecutors and children's advocates called for reforms of the adver-
sary trial process. Legislators and judges in several Western countries took up the
call for reform and amended time-honored rules of evidence and procedure to
facilitate children's testimony and make the court process less trying for young
witnesses.4
As prosecutors focused increased attention on child witnesses, so did academic
psychologists. The 1980s ushered in a new era of psychological research on
investigative interviewing, the psychological effects of testifying, and children's
suggestibility.5 Findings from this research supported many of the legal reforms
1. See infra note 3 and accompanying text (listing sources).
2. See infra note 3 and accompanying text (identifying sources).
3. See Gail S. Goodman, Elizabeth Pyle Taub, David P.H. Jones, Patricia England, Linda K. Port, Leslie
Rudy & Lydia Prado, Testifying in Criminal Court, hi 57 MONOGRAPHS OFTHE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter Testifying in Crminal Court] (chronicling results of research in which
Goodman followed 218 children for the two-year period of their involvement in the Denver, Colorado criminal
justice system); see also Regina v. D.O.L., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419.
4. See INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *. For
additional information, the most complete compilation of American reforms regarding child abuse and child
witnesses is available from the National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, a Division of the American
Prosecutors Research Institute, which is part of the National District Attorneys Association. The address for the
National Center is 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510, Alexandria, Virginia 22314.
5. See Gall S. Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 9 (1984).
The author wrote:
Today's burst of research on psychology and law can be traced to several factors. The activism
of the 1960s, the courts' changing attitudes toward civil and criminal rights, and an increased openness
of the courts to testimony of psychological experts all contributed to the revival. The reawakening of
research in psychology and law inevitably fosters a reemergence of research on child witnesses. But
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designed to improve the investigation of child abuse-particularly in the interviewing
of young children-and the accommodation of child witnesses in court.6
Improving investigative interviewing is a priority in all nations. When it comes
to improving the treatment of children in court, however, reform occurred primarily
in countries that followed the common law tradition with its emphasis on adversarial
trial procedure. The pressure for courtroom reform is greater in common law coun-
tries than in nations that employ the "inquisitorial" procedures of the civil law. Part
I of this Article explains why this is so by describing a major procedural difference
between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems. Part II describes legal reforms in
countries that adhere to the adversarial model, including Australia, Canada, England,
Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and the United States.
Much has been accomplished during the past decade to improve investigative
practices and accommodate children in court. To date, however, few efforts have
been made to distill the patchwork of reforms into a comprehensive Child Witness
Code .7 The proposed code at the end of this Article marks a step toward such a code.
I. THE DIFFICULTY OF COURTROOM REFORM IN COUNTRIES THAT EMPLOY THE
SYSTEM OF ADVERSARIAL TRIAL PRACTICE
An article discussing legal reforms to accommodate young witnesses should not
ignore an important procedural distinction between the two legal systems that
dominate the Western World: the common law and the civil law. The distinction
society's increased concern with children's rights and protecting children from abuse also spurs this
endeavor. Moreover, advances in developmental theory should enable researchers to approach the study
from a more enlightened perspective.
Id. at 23; see also John E.B. Myers, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S. Goodman. Psychological Research on Children
as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. LJ. 3 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Mental health professionals who are experts on child
witnesses occasionally suggest that implementation of legal change should await empirical validation. See Julie A.
Lipovsky, The Impact of Court on Children: Research Findings and Practical Recommendations, 9 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 238, 248 (1994). Although empirical study plays an important role in reforming the
legal system, scientific validation has never been, nor is it likely to become, a condition precedent to law reform.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed long ago that:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of
a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1951) (n.p. 1881). The reform movement to accommodate child
witnesses was driven not so much by science as by the felt necessity of our time to respond to the reality of child
abuse, and to reform a legal system that sometimes traumatizes children and impairs their ability to testify. Although
psychological research played only a subsidiary role in the reform movement, such research is important and
deserves the attention of the bench, bar, and legislature.
7. The U.S. Congress comes close to a comprehensive child witness code. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (West
1995). In Ireland, the Criminal Evidence Act of 1992 contains important provisions regarding child witnesses.
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helps explain why reform is more important yet more difficult in the former than the
latter.
Most European countries are traditionally classified as following the civil law
system. The civil law system traces its origins to Roman law, with major con-
tributions over the centuries from France, Germany, and other countries. The com-
mon law originated in England and was received or adopted by English colonies.
In terms of accommodating children in court, the most important difference
between the civil and common law systems concerns trial procedure rather than sub-
stantive law. Although the procedural distinction between the two systems is far from
pure, it is a distinction with a difference. Common law countries generally follow the
adversarial or, as it is sometimes called, accusatorial system of justice. Civil law
countries, by contrast, employ an inquisitorial trial procedure. John Spencer and
Rhona Flin described the difference:
It is generally accepted that there are two main systems of trial in the
civilized world: the accusatorial (alias adversarial) and the inquisitorial. In
an accusatorial system each side presents a case before a court the function
of which is limited to deciding who has won. The judges have nothing to do
with the preliminary investigations, give no help to either side in presenting
its case, and take no active steps to discover the truth, which emerges-or
so the theory goes-from the clash of conflicting accounts. . . . In an
inquisitorial system, on the other hand, the court is viewed as a public
agency appointed to get to the bottom of the disputed matter. The court takes
the initiative in gathering information as soon as it has notice of the dispute,
builds up a file on the matter by questioning all those it thinks may have
useful information to offer-including, in a criminal case, the defendant-
and then applies its reasoning powers to the material it has collected in order
to determine where the truth lies.8
In common law countries, tremendous significance is placed on adversarial
cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation between witnesses and the accused.
By contrast, in the inquisitorial system, less significance is attributed to cross-
examination and confrontation. Moreover, in the inquisitorial system, the judge often
takes an active or leading role in questioning witnesses. The inquisitorial system
lowers the rhetorical volume to a level that is more manageable for children.
Common law countries are so deeply wedded to adversarial cross-examination
and face-to-face confrontation that reforms to accommodate children are difficult in
8. JOHN R. SPENCER & RHONA FLiN, THE EvDENCE OF CHILDREN 75 (2d ed. 1993). This excellent book
contains a thorough analysis of the law in England and Scotland. The book also provides valuable information on
other countries.
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such countries.9 Indeed, in the United States, cross-examination and confrontation
are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,' ° and the con-
stitutional stature of these rights makes reform particularly difficult.
H. THE MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING AND
ACCOMMODATE CHILDREN IN COURT
This Part describes reforms that have taken place in three arenas: (1)
Investigative interviewing, (2) preparing children for court, and (3) courtroom
accommodations.
A. Investigative Interviews
The way children are interviewed by police officers, social workers, and other
professionals has a direct bearing on children's credibility." In the late 1980s,
defense attorneys began assailing the questioning techniques used to interview
children.'2 Defense counsel argue that improper interviewing renders children's
9. See Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 3 (where the authors observe that "[tihe court system,
established with adult defendants and witnesses in mind, does not easily accommodate children's special needs").
10. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that
the defendant's right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is protected by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17
(1974); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ('The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness:).
11. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
12. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (pediatrician asked leading questions of two-year-
old); United State v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1995); Guam v.
Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1993) (child's hearsay not sufficiently reliable because social worker and mother
discussed abuse in child's presence); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1986) (interviewers were
careful to avoid too much leading); Wilkinson v. Balsam, 885 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D. Vt. 1995); United States v.
Banks, 36 M.J. 150, 152 (C.M.A. 1992) (theory of defense case was that the idea of abuse was planted through
improper interviews); United States v, Cox, 42 MJ. 647, 650 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (doctor appeared as a
defense expert in 'investigative evaluations and in child sexual abuse'); United States v. Geiss, 30 M.J. 678, 680
(A.F.C.M.R. 1990) (interview questioning was overly complex and suggestive, and did not comport with
recommended procedures outlined in regulations); State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338, 1345-48 (Fla. 1993); State v.
Malarney, 617 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (reversal because of trial court's exclusion of defense expert
testimony challenging conduct of interviews); State v. Poole, 859 P.2d 944, 945-46 (Idaho 1993); Hulbert v. State,
529 N.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); People v. Zwart, 600 N.E.2d 1169, 1171-74 (il1. 1992) (under child
hearsay exception, state failed to establish that suggestive interviews did not occur); State v. Mazerolle, 614 A.2d
68, 71-72 (Me. 1992) (not error to reject defense expert testimony on suggestibility; there was no evidence the
children had been interviewed suggestively); Commonwealth v. Clements, 629 N.E.2d 361,364-65 (Mass. Ct. App.
1994) (defendant sought unsuccessfully on appeal to argue that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to offer expert
testimony to attack interviews); State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (Minn. 1993) (repetitious pretrial use with
child of highly suggestive book, along with child's contradictory testimony, led to conclusion that evidence was
insufficient to support conviction); Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220 (Nev. 1993) (interviewing is the central issue in
the ease); In re Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 745-46 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (under residual hearsay exception, court
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descriptions of abuse unreliable. 13 The United States Supreme Court came to grips
with this issue in Idaho v. Wright,4 in which the prosecution of a child sexual abuse
case foundered due to a pediatrician's leading questions of a two-and-a-half-year-old
child. The Court recognized the danger of excessive leading questions, although it
also acknowledged that the "use of leading questions with children, when appro-
priate, does not necessarily render responses untrustworthy .... ,, " Following
Wright, decided in 1990, the attack on interviewers intensified, 6 culminating in the
expresses concern about impact of suggestive questions on reliability); State v. Robertson, 444 S.E.2d 643 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1994) (court did not err in excluding defense expert testimony on general phenomenon of suggestibility;
expert had not examined child); In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); in re Dunbar, 647 A.2d 316,
319-321 (Vt. 1994) (defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for not more aggressively pursuing a
coaching defense; held: trial counsel was not ineffective; there was no hard evidence of coaching); State v. Swan,
790 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1990) (court saw no evidence of improper interviewing); L.H. v. L.H., 465 S.E.2d 841, 854
(W. Va. 1995); State v. Kirschbaum, 535 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Many jurisdictions also recognize
the utility of expert testimony on the suggestive interview techniques used with a young child and how suggestive
techniques can shape a young child witness's answers.").
13. See supra note 12 (citing authorities); see also 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECrCASES § 4.5 (1996) (describing defense attack on interviewer) [hereinafter MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD
ABUSE].
14. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
15. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
16. See supra note 12 (citing authorities). During the late 1980s and 1990s, nonjudicial writing on children's
credibility became increasingly critical of investigative interviewing and of children's abilities. See, e.g., LUCY S.
MCGOUGH, CHILD WrrNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1994); Stephen J. Ceci &
Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403
(1993); Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation
of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927 (1993); Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who
Believe the Children? The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute. 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 207 (1995). Articles written specifically for the defense bar focused increasingly on interviewing and
children's suggestibility. The Champion is the journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys.
A review of The Champion reveals a notable number of articles discussing this issue. See, e.g., 3. Leonard Fleet,
A Judge's View ofa Child-Victim Case, I 1 CHAMPION 6, 6 (1987) ("[I]t is common for persons who interview
child-victims to display, either vocally or by body language, approval or disapproval of what the child says. It is
not uncommon for children to recognize such adult response and unconsciously adjust their answers so as to obtain
from the adult that reaction which the child finds most rewarding .... ); Richard A. Gardner, Child Sex Abuse, 18
CHAMPION 42 (1994); Nancy Hellander & JoAnn Chase, The Incompetent Child Witness, 13 CHAMPION 13, 13
(1989) ("a dramatic rise in truly false allegations").
[A] social worker-usually has a plethora of information from doctors, relatives, teachers, neighbors, etc.,
which would cause him or her to be biased and to have a set of preconceived notions as to what to
expect from a child suspected to have been abused ....
Paul F. Herzog, Child Sexual Abuse Defense: Pre-Trial Investigation, Experts, and Proxy Testimony, II CHAMPION
10, 12 (1987); Richard G. Lubin, The Trial ofa Child SexualAbuse Case, 14 CHAMPION 18 (1990) ("[l]nvestigators
ask the children leading questions or send subliminal signals to the child through body language or words spoken
... ."); Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, Interviewing the Alleged Victim in Cases of Child Sex Abuse: The
Role of the Psychologist, 11 CHAMPION 17, 18 (1987) ("[The way children are currently interviewed may not result
in obtaining the truth about what really happened. The story that is told often is the one the interviewer wants to
hear .... "); Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Effective Use of a Mental Health Expert in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 14 CHAMPION 20 (1990) ("It is through adult social influence that a child can make untrue statements
of sexual abuse. Therefore, you must obtain as much information as possible about all contacts the child has had
with adults who believe the abuse is real ... ").
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New Jersey Supreme Court's 1994 decision in State v. Michaels.t7 In Michaels, the
court ruled that egregiously defective pretrial interviews can violate a defendant's
right to a fair trial. t8 The Michaels court reviewed the psychological literature on
interviewing and children's suggestibility and determined that
a sufficient consensus exists within the academic, professional, and law
enforcement communities, confirmed in varying degrees by courts, to
warrant the conclusion that the use of coercive or highly suggestive
interrogation techniques can create a significant risk that the interrogation
itself will distort the child's recollection of events, thereby undermining the
reliability of the statements and subsequent testimony concerning such
events. 19
The New Jersey court held that a defendant in a criminal case may request a
pretrial hearing-called a "taint hearing"--to determine whether improper inter-
viewing so far undermined the reliability of children's memories that their out-of-
court statements or trial testimony should be excluded? Defense counsel in other
jurisdictions are picking up the Michaels ball and seeking taint hearings with child
witnesses.2
There is no gainsaying that defective interviewing exists.22 Indeed, some of the
interviews in the Michaels case are textbook examples of how not to talk to
children.u3 Despite the assertions of some critics,24 however, there is no concrete
17. 642 A.2d 1372 (NJ. 1994).
18. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. The court ruled that pretrial use of unnecessarily suggestive interview
methods "implicates principles of constitutional due process." Id.
19. Id. at 1379.
20. See id. at 1380. The Michaels court concluded on the facts before it that: "[A] hearing must be held to
determine whether those clearly improper interrogations so infected the ability of the children to recall the alleged
abusive events that their pretrial statements and in-court testimony based on that recollection are unreliable and
should not be admitted into evidence." Id. For an argument against taint hearings, see John E.B. Myers, Taint
Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 875 (1994).
21. See Fischbach v. State, No. 245, 1996 WL. 145968 (Del. Mar. 15, 1996) (unpublished disposition);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 665 N.E.2d 105 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1994); State v. Allen, No. 94CA005944, 1996 WL 48550 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1996) (unpublished
opinion); State v. Smith, No. 95CA006070, 1996 WL 27908 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 24, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
22. Much remains to be done to train interviewers. One of the most serious problems is the high turnover
rate of professionals-particularly social workers-who interview children.
23. See Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1372 app.
24. See Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, Ainicus Brieffor the Case of State of New Jersey v. Michaels
Presented by Coinnittee of Concerned Social Scientists, I PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 272 (1995) [hereinafter Bruck
& Ceci, Amicus Brier]; Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review
and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993). For criticism of Bruck and Ceci's amicus brief, see Thomas D.
Lyon, False Allegations and False Denials in Child Sexual Abuse, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 429 (1995). For
criticism of Ceci and Bruck's article in Psychological Bulletin, see John E.B. Myers, New Era of Skepticism
Regarding Children's Credibility, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 387 (1995). For criticism of Lyon and Myers's
criticism, see Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Children's Allegations of Sexual Abuse: Forensic and Scientific
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evidence that defective interviewing is the norm. Moreover, serious efforts are
underway in the United States and elsewhere to improve the skills of the police
officers, social workers, and others who interview children.2S Books and articles on
interviewing proliferated after 1990.2 Interviewing is a regular topic at national 
27
and regional child abuse conferences.2 Many state and local child welfare agencies
Issues: A Reply to Commentators, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 494 (1995).
25. Important research has been completed on innovative ways to reduce children's suggestibility and
enhance their memories during interviews. See R. Edward Geiselman, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail K. Bornstein, Effects
of Cognitive Questioning Techniques on Children's Recall Performance, in CHILD VICTmiS, CHILD WITNESSES:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 71 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Cognitive Questioning]; Karen J. Saywitz & Susan Moan-Hardie, Reducing the Potential for Distortion of
ChildhoodMemories, 3 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 408 (1994). There are financial and institutional obstacles
to training. See David Marxsen, John C. Yuille & Melissa Nisbet, The Complexities of Eliciting and Assessing
Children's Statements, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 450,453-54 (1995).
26. See, e.g., AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN, GUIDELINES FOR
PSYCHOSOCIALEVALUATIONOFSUSPECTEDSEXUALABUSEINYOUNG CHILDREN (1990); AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL
SOCIETY ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN, PRACTICE GUIDELINES: USE OF ANATOMICAL DOLLS IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE ASSESSMENTS (1995); KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL MALTREATMENT
(1990); JAMES GARBARINO & FRANCES M. STOrr, WHAT CHILDREN CAN TELL Us: ELICITING, INTERPRETING, AND
EVALUATING INFORMATION FROM CHILDREN (1989); DAVID P.H. JONES, INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED
CHILD: INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED ABUSE (1992); MARCIA MORGAN, HOW TO INTERVIEW SEXUAL ABUSE
VICTIMS: INCLUDING THE USE OF ANATOMICAL DOLLS (1995); JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CIIILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT (1992); NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL ISSUES
AND DILEMMAS (1991); ANNE GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A LINGUISTIC
PERSPECTIVE (1994); Cognitive Questioning, supra note 25, at 71; Michael E. Lamb, Kathleen J. Steinberg &
Phillip W. Esplin, Making Children into Competent Witnesses: Reactions to the Amicus Brief ln re Michaels, I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 438 (1995); David C. Raskin & Phillip W. Esplin, Setting the Tone for an Interview,
4 NRCCSA NEWS 3 (1995) (newsletter of the National Resource Center on Child Sexual Abuse); Melissa
Steinmetz, Interviewing Children: Balancing Forensic and Therapeutic Techniques, 4 NRCCSA NEWS 1 (1995)
(newsletter of the National Resource Center on Child Sexual Abuse); John C. Yuille, Robin Hunter, Risha Joffe
& Judy Zaparniuk, Interviewing Children in Sexual Abuse Cases, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVINGTESTIMONY, supra note 25, at 95. Although much of the material on interviewing
appeared after 1990, material for interviewers also appeared during the 1980s. See, e.g., Council on Scientific
Affairs, American Medical Association, AMA Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines Concerning Child Abuse atnd
Neglect, 254 JAMA 796, 799 (1985); Barbara W. Boat & Mark D. Everson, hIterviewing Young Children with
Anatomical Dolls, 67 CHILD WELFARE 337 (1988).
27. There are several national yearly meetings devoted to child abuse and neglect. The "San Diego
Conference" is sponsored every year by the Child Protection Center of Children's Hospital in San Diego.
Interviewing is a regular topic at the "San Diego Conference." The annual Midwest Conference on Child Sexual
Abuse and Incest is sponsored by the University of Wisconsin-Madison. At the November 1995 Midwest
Conference, two workshops were devoted to interviewing. The National Symposium on Child Sexual Abuse is held
each spring in Huntsville, Alabama, by the National Resource Center on Child Sexual Abuse. Interviewing is a
routine topic. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children holds an annual training colloquium
at a selected city, and interviewing is invariably on the program.
28. The University of California at Davis sponsors an annual child abuse conference that draws professionals
from northern California. Since 1991, interviewing children has been a major topic at the conference. See
Telephone Interview with Marilyn Peterson, Director of the University of California, Davis, Davis Medical Center,
Child Protection Center (July 20, 1994) (notes on file with author).
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have increased efforts to train social workers.29 Tennessee, for example, has a
program to certify child protection workers in a broad range of topics including
interviewing young children.30 Certification and specialized training programs are
also underway in other states, including Alabama, California, Florida, New York,
Ohio, Mississippi, and Washington.3 Michigan has a child welfare training
institute.32 Illinois has a consortium of social work schools training child welfare
workers. 33 Law enforcement agencies improved training for interviewers.M The
Federal Government provides funds to improve investigation of child abuse.35
Training curricula have been produced and distributed by organizations such as the
National Resource Center on Child Sexual Abuse 36 and the Children's Division of
the American Humane Association.3 7 Pat Schene, the former director of American
Humane's Children's Division, observes that during the past ten years "numerous
forces have moved the training agenda forward. ' 38 John Doris, Rosaleen Mazur, and
Marney Thomas point out that although much remains to be accomplished on the
training front, "[t]he history of [child protective services] training over the past ten
to fifteen years exhibits impressive expansion, development, and adaptation to new
29. In Oregon, for example, the Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Services Program (CARES),
associated with Emanual Hospital in Portland, contracts with the State Department of Social Services to provide
training for new protective services social workers. This training includes information on physical abuse, sexual
abuse, and interviewing. See Telephone Interview with Jan Bays, M.D., Director of the CARES Program (July 20,
1994) (notes on file with author). In 1994, in San Jose, California, the Santa Clara County Department of Social
Services, in cooperation with the School of Social Work at California State University, San Jose, began a program
to certify social workers in Forensic Child Welfare Practice. See generally Jennifer Miller & Martha M. Dore,
Innovations in Child Protective Services Inservice Training: Commitment to Excellence, 70 CHILD WELFARE 437
(1991).
30. See Telephone Interview with Charles Wilson, former Director of Child Welfare, Tennessee Departmagnt
of Human Services (July 20, 1994) (notes on file with author).
31. See Charles Wilson & Susan C. Steppe, Backlash and Child Protective Services frorn the Perspective
of State CPS Administrators, in THE BACKLASH: CHILD PROTECrION UNDER FIRE 60, 62 (John E.B. Myers ed.,
1994).
32. See Telephone Interview with Kathleen Coulborn Faller, School of Social Work, University of Michigan
(July 21, 1994) (notes on file with author).
33. See id.
34. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have greatly increased training on child abuse and
on proper interviewing techniques. See Telephone Interview with Sergeant Rick Cage, Montgomery County,
Maryland, Police Department (July 22, 1994) (notes on file with author).
35. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-19c (West 1983 & Supp. 1996).
36. The National Resource Center is located in Huntsville, Alabama.
37. The American Humane Association is located in Denver, Colorado.
38. Telephone Interview with Pat Schene, former Director, Children's Division, American Humane
Association (July 20, 1994) (notes on file with author).
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challenges . ,,39 The concerted effort to train interviewers is among the most
laudable and important reforms of the child protection system.
State legislatures have supported improvements in interviewing and investigation
in child abuse cases.40 Thirty-three states have legislation that requires or encourages
joint investigation and cooperation between law enforcement and child protective
services.41 An equal number of states have laws authorizing multidisciplinary child
protection teams.42 In cases investigated by federal law enforcement officials, "[a]
multi-disciplinary child abuse team shall be used when it is feasible to do so.
'43
39. John Doris, Rosaleen Mazur & Marney Thomas, Training in Child Protective Services: A Commentary
on the Amicus Brief of Bruck and Ceci (1993/1995), 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 479, 491 (1995). The authors
described training for child protective services social workers in New York and elsewhere in the United States:
The organized and formal training of child protective services (CPS) workers is relatively recent
and is constantly undergoing rapid expansion and development, driven by the increasing number of
reports of child maltreatment and by public and professional concern for the effectiveness of our CPS
systems ....
Id. at 479.
... Beginning in the 1980s, however, and in response to the growing sense of crisis in child protection,
many agencies began to reorganize the delivery of services and develop more formal programs of
training, with the latter being facilitated by uniform statewide curricula and training facilities.
Id. at 482.
Present-day sexual abuse training programs with which we are familiar typically reflect the latest
information from the steady stream of critical research outlining the issues in interviewing children.
Information on the suggestibility of children, their accuracy in recounting events, the development of
their memory, and the many useful protocols and instruments for conducting a forensically adequate
interview are made available to the trainee. Most child protective workers who have attended training
in the last few years have been exposed to this information.
Id. at 490.
40. In California, for example, the legislature in 1986 created the Child Victim Witness Judicial Advisory
Committee "to study investigative and judicial practices and procedures as they pertain to child victims and
witnesses .... Specifically, the Committee was asked to make recommendations for: Minimizing or reducing
unnecessary repetitive interviews and court appearances of child victim witnesses ... " CALIFORNIA ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CHILD VICTIM WITNESS JUDICIALADvISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT iii (1988).
The Committee made 53 recommendations to improve the investigation and litigation of child abuse cases. Id. at
106-15. The California Legislature responded to the Committee's recommendations with legislative reforms and
with the enactment in 1989 of the California Child Victim Witness Pilot and Demonstration Program. This
legislation "required the Attorney General to establish up to three pilot projects to implement and evaluate multi
disciplinary interview centers." CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, CHILD VICTIM WITNESS INVESTIGATIVE
PILOT PROJECTS: RESEARCH AND EVALUATION FINAL REPORT (1994) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. Three year pilot
projects were established in Orange and Sacramento counties to evaluate the use of multidisciplinary interview
centers. A research and evaluation advisory panel evaluated the pilot projects and reported its findings in the Final
Report cited above. The effort to improve investigation continues apace in California. In 1993, a Multidisciplinary
State Task Force on Children's Justice was established under the aegis of the Office of Criminal Justice Planning.
This task force allocated funds to create two training centers in California to train professionals in the
multidisciplinary investigation of child abuse.
41. See generally III NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CLEARINGHOUSE, CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES SERIES Investigations tab. 16, p.1 (1995) (surveying all states).
42. See generally id. at tab. 17, p.l (surveying all states).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(g)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
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Alabama and West Virginia have statutes that authorize judges to limit the number
of investigative interviews of children.44
One of the more controversial issues in the realm of interviewing is whether
investigative interviews should be videotaped.45 Arguments in favor of videotaping
fall into four overlapping categories. 46 First, videotaping may reduce trauma to
children by reducing the number of interviews during which the child must describe
abuse. Second, videotaping preserves the child's early description of abuse-while
memory of the incident is fresh. Third, the videotaped interview is often powerful
evidence that may be admissible in later legal proceedings. Fourth, videotaping is
likely to increase the quality of interviews because interviewers realize their per-
formance will be preserved for later critique.
Opponents of videotaping raise three principle objections. First, opponents argue
that videotaping gives the defense "too much ammunition" to attack the child's
credibility. Using the videotape, defense counsel places exaggerated emphasis on
minor, and inevitable, inconsistencies between videotaped statements and the child's
other statements describing abuse. Second, opponents charge that the videotape
assumes exaggerated importance in the trial, forcing other important evidence into
44. Section 15-1-2 of the Code of Alabama states:
The presiding judge of a judicial circuit, after consultation with the district attorney for the judicial
circuit may provide for reasonable limits on the number of interviews a victim of sexual abuse or
exploitation, who is under 12 years of age, must submit to for law enforcement or other purposes. The
judge shall, to the extent possible, protect the victim from the psychological damage of repeated
interrogation while preserving the rights of the public, the victim, and the person charged with the
violation.
ALA. CODE § 15-1-2(a) (Supp. 1994).
Similarly, section 61-8-13(a) of the West Virginia Code reads as follows:
In any prosecution under the provisions of section twelve [§ 61-8-12] of this article, the court may
provide by role for reasonable limits on the number of interviews to which a victim who is eleven years
old or less must submit for law-enforcement or discovery purposes. To the extent possible the rule shall
protect the mental and emotional health of the child from the psychological damage of repeated
interrogation and at the same time preserve the rights of the public and the defendant.
W. VA. CODE § 61-8-13(a) (1992).
45. Compare Paul Stem, Videotaping Child Interviews: A Detriment to an Accurate Determination of Guilt,
7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278 (1992) with Catherine Stephenson, Videotaping and How It Works Well in San
Diego, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 284 (1992). The arguments for and against videotaping are discussed in John
E.B. Myers. Investigative Interviews of Children: Should They Be Videotaped?, 7 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 371 (1993) [hereinafter Myers, Investigative Interviews]. At least one proponent of videotaping investigative
interviews goes too far in her zeal to tape. In an appendix to her otherwise thoughtful book titled CHiLD WITNESSES:
FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1994), Lucy S. McGough proposed a statute that would bar
any child under the age of twelve from testifying in a criminal case unless the child was interviewed on videotape
according to procedures that are so detailed, numerous, and strict that very few investigative interviews would ever
measure up. Id. at 271. McGough's proposal would result in the routine loss of reliable evidence.
46. In addition to the advantages of videotaping mentioned in the text, videotaping may: discourage
recantation; convince a nonoffending parent that abuse occurred; encourage the defendant to confess; refresh a
child's memory prior to testifying; or assist an expert witness in assessing whether a child was abused.
1996/Steps Toward A Child Witness Code
the background. Finally, opponents assert that defense attorneys and their experts
exaggerate or invent errors committed by interviewers'
Research conducted under the auspices of the California Attorney General's
Office provides support for videotaping investigative interviews.4 8 Pilot projects in
Sacramento and Orange Counties evaluated the use of multidisciplinary interview
centers-including videotaping-in child abuse cases. At each interview center a
predetermined number of investigative interviews (100) were conducted without
videotaping. When the nonvideotape portion of the evaluation was complete, an
equal number of interviews were videotaped. Professionals involved in the investi-
gative process were questioned about videotaping at the beginning of the pilot
projects (1991), before they had experience with videotaping.49 Two years later
(1993), professionals were questioned again, after amassing considerable experience
with videotaped interviews. The Final Report on the pilot projects states:
The videotape surveys distributed in 1991 and 1993 provide powerful
evidence supporting the utility of videotaping interviews conducted at multi
disciplinary interviews centers.... Many professionals believe videotaping
has both positive and negative effects. In the present evaluation, however,
the number of individuals mentioning helpful effects of videotaping far
outweighs the number mentioning harmful effects. In 1993, eighty-three
percent of Sacramento and Orange [C]ounty respondents indicated that
videotaping has helpful effects on the investigation. Only 30% of respon-
dents mentioned harmful effects of videotaping. Among professionals who
mentioned harmful effects of videotaping, the existence of harmful effects
generally does not translate into blanket opposition to videotapingP0
... In Sacramento and Orange [C]ounties 63% of respondents favor routine
videotaping, 26% favor selective [videotaping], and only 5% of respondents
expressed the view that interviews should not be videotaped in the future.s'
47. Another drawback to videotaping is that recording everything a child says is impossible; yet, if
videotaping becomes the norm, children's statements that are not on tape may be viewed with undue suspicion.
Also, videotaping can cause stage fright, poor tape quality may cast doubt on the child's disclosure, and videotapes
may fall into the wrong hands. For a discussion of these arguments, see Myers, Investigative Interviews, supra note
45.
48. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 40.
49. Survey questionnaires were distributed in 1991, at the beginning of the pilot projects, and again in 1993,
at the end, to law enforcement officers, prosecutors, social workers, interviewers, and a small number of judges.
50. FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 69-70.
51. Id. at 70. The actual number of individuals who said interviews should not be videotaped was two in
Sacramento County and two in Orange County. Id.
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Most professionals surveyed "felt that videotaping contributed to lower trauma
for children. 52 Moreover, most professionals stated that "videotaping improves the
investigative process."'53
The Final Report concludes that "[t]he pilot projects provide clear support for
videotaping interviews that occur at well run multidisciplinary interview centers.
Moreover, most professionals involved in the pilots believe videotaping should be
routine. In Sacramento and Orange Counties, the specter of injustice that is feared by
opponents of videotaping did not materialize. What emerged instead is a clear con-
sensus that videotaping helps lower trauma for children and contributes to the search
for truth." 4
In England, the government devoted considerable attention to videotaping
investigative interviews and improving the skills of interviewers. The 1991 Criminal
Justice Act allows videotaped interviews to be admitted in evidence "as a substitute
for the child's evidence-in-chief at trial. ''a5 In 1992 the Home Office and the Depart-
ment of Health issued a Memorandum of Good Practice56 "to help those making a
video recording of an interview with a child witness where it is intended the result
should be acceptable in criminal proceedings."57 Research by Graham Davies and his
colleagues reveals that professionals in England are generally enthusiastic about
videotaping and the Memorandum of Good Practice.5
The Child Witness Code at the end of this Article includes provisions on investi-
gative interviews.
B. Preparing Children to Testify
52. Id. at 69.
53. Id. Many professionals felt that videotaping improves the quality of interviewing. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 40, stated:
Professionals involved in the pilot projects support the argument that videotaping elicits good
interviewing. One of the child interview specialists put it bluntly when she wrote that videotapes are
"insurance for interviewers." The same interview specialist adds that "when there is no videotape, the
interview (which is the foundation of the case) is left wide open for criticism. Nothing defends the
interview more than the videotape." Another interview specialist opines that videotaping "keeps the
interviewer accountable [and] protects the interviewer from attack." A third interview specialist points
out that with videotaping there are "no hidden outcomes." A juvenile court referee adds that "taping
helps demonstrate whether manipulation or influence are present" during the interview. A sheriff's
deputy states that the videotape "eliminates questions as to exactly what was said." A Deputy District
Attorney writes that the videotape "eliminates entirely the implication that kids are 'coached' or told
what to say."
Id. at 72.
54. Id. at 79.
55. GRAHAM DAVIES, CLARE WILSON, REBECCA MITCHELL & JOHN MILSOM, VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S
EVIDENCE: AN EVALUATION I (1995) [hereinafter VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE].
56. HOME OFFICE AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MEMORANDUM OF GOOD PRACTICE ON VIDEO RECORDED
INTERVIEWS wrIH CHILD WITNESSES FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (1992).
57. Id. at 1.
58. See VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55.
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Testifying in court is difficult for child witnesses,59 and professionals owe it to
children to prepare them for the experience.o Karen Saywitz and Lynn Snyder
remind us that "[p]reparation of children for painful medical procedures has proven
successful in lowering children's perceptions of pain and raising their level of
cooperation. Children facing similarly stressful forensic procedures deserve no
less.",61 Research by Louise Dezwirek Sas and her colleagues at the Child Witness
Project of the London Family Court Clinic in London, Ontario, and Canada,
demonstrated the utility of preparation.62 Dezwirek Sas wrote:
[Tihe court preparation offered by the Child Witness Project benefitted the
child witnesses in four distinct ways:
1. By educating them about court procedures
2. By helping them deal with their stress and anxieties related to the
abuse and to testifying
3. By helping them tell their story competently on the stand in court
59. See DEBRA WHITCOMB, GAIL S. GOODMAN, DEsMOND K. RUNYAN & SHIRLEY HOAK, THE EMOTIONAL
EFFECTS OFTESTIFYING ON SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (1994) (U.S. Department of Justice, Natioinal Institute
of Justice, Research in Brief); Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3.
60. Rhona Flin, Children's Testimony: Psychology on Trial, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD
WrrNEss 240,249 (Maria S. Zaragoza, John R. Graham, Gordon C.N. Hall, Richard Hirschman & Yossef S. Ben-
Porath eds., 1995). I know of no research on the percent of American children who are prepared for the courtroom
or on the quality of such preparation. A study of English child witnesses revealed that fully 30% received no
preparation at all. VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55, at 29. Professor Davies described
preparation of English children who testify via live link video technology:
Prior to attending the trial, 60% of child witnesses were given a guided tour of the court, of which 94%
saw the live link. However, only 43% of those children taken on a court tour were allowed to practice
on the live link prior to giving evidence. Thus, only 25% of all children attending live link/videotape
trials in the present study had practiced using the link prior to the trial. Approximately 30% of child
witnesses had no preparation prior to attending court.
Id.
61. Karen J. Saywitz & Lynn Snyder, Improving Children's Testimony with Preparation, in CHILD VICTIMS,
CHILD WrNiESSEs: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY, supra note 25, at 117, 119. Saywitz and Snyder
wrote:
When attorneys prepare children for court, they typically provide a tour of the courtroom and perhaps
a cursory review of the facts of the case. Despite the lack of empirical evidence, these steps are assumed
to decrease anxiety and improve performance on the stand. Attorneys usually feel they have done their
job after escorting a young witness through the courtroom and saying, for example, "There's the jury
box. That's where the judge sits." This is only the beginning. Such an introduction addresses neither an
explanation of the investigative or judicial process nor the challenges child witnesses face within the
legal system.
Id. at 123.
62. See LOUISEDEZWIREK SAS, PAMELA HURLEY, ALISON HATCH, SUE MALLA &TRISH DICK, THREE YEARS
AFTER THE VERDICT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT OF CHILD
WITNESSES REFERRED TO THE CHILD WITNESS PROJECT (1993) [hereinafter ADJUSTMENT OF CHILD WITNESSES];
LOUISE SAS, G. AUSTIN, D. WOLFE, P. HURLEY, REDUCING THE SYSTEM-INDUCED TRAUMA FOR CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE VICTIMS THROUGH COURT PREPARATION, ASSESSMENT, AND FOLLOW-UP (1991) [hereinafter REDUCING
TRAUMA].
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4. By providing an advocacy role on their behalf with the other
mandated agencies in the criminal justice system.63
Court preparation programs operate in a number of communities, including
Huntsville, Alabama, 64 San Diego, California, 65 and Seattle, Washington.6Empirical
research suggests that preparation can increase children's memory retention, reduce
suggestibility, and lower stress.6 7
The Child Witness Code proposed at the end of this Article contains a section
regarding preparation.
C. Courtroom Testimony
Considerable legislative and judicial effort has focused on reforming criminal
courtroom procedures to better accommodate child witnesses, and progress has been
impressive.68 Less energy has been devoted to reforming noncriminal procedures,
such as those in family and juvenile court. The paucity of reform in noncriminal
forums is likely due to two factors. First, judges feel greater flexibility to accom-
modate children in noncriminal proceedings: Thus, the need for reform is less
compelling. Second, although noncriminal proceedings are extremely important for
children, disproportionate attention is focused on the more highly visible and
contentious criminal justice system.
For purposes of discussion, it is convenient to place courtroom reforms into
twelve categories, with the twelfth serving as a catchall for reforms that do not fit
conveniently elsewhere. The categories are:
63. See ADJUSTMENT OF CHILD WITNESSES, supra note 62, at 195-96.
64. See Kathryn Sisterman Keeney, Ethel Amacher & Julie A. Kastanakis, The Court Prep Group: A Vital
Part of the Court Process, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 201 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds., 1992).
65. See Telephone Interview with C. Tammariello, Project Coordinator, Kids in Court Program, Center for
Child Protection, Children's Hospital, San Diego, California (July 20, 1995) (notes on file with author).
66. See Telephone Interview with D. Belin, Executive Director, King County, Washington, Kids' Court
Program (August 9, 1995) (notes on file with author).
67. See REDUCING TRAUMA, supra note 62; KAREN J. SAYwrrz, REBECCA NATHANSON, LYNN SNYDER &
VIVIAN LAMPHEAR, PREPARING CHILDREN FOR THE INVESTIGATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCESS: IMPROVING
COMMUNICATION, MEMORY AND EMOTIONAL RESILIENCE: FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1993); Saywitz & Snyder, supra note 61, at 117.
68. See VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55; MCGOUGH, supra note 16; KATHLEEN
MURRAY, LIVETELEVISION LINK: AN EVALUATION OF ITS USE BY CHILD WITNESSES IN SCOTTISH CRIMINAL TRIALS
(1995) (The Scottish Office, Central Research Unit); MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13; SPENCER
& FuN, supra note 8; Graham Davies & Clare Wilson, The Videotaping of Children Evidence: Issues of Research
and Practice, in PRACTITIONER'S CHILD L. BULL. 68, 68 (1994) ("The past five years have seen more changes to
the law and procedure governing child witnesses in England and Wales in criminal cases than the last half-century
. .."); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 806 (1985) [hereinafter Two Legislative Innovations]. One of, if not the earliest, calls for reform is David
Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
977 (1969).
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1. Admissibility of children's hearsay statements.
2. Competence to testify as a witness, and administration and under-
standing of the oath.
3. Altering the courtroom to accommodate child witnesses.
4. Judicial control of the proceedings and questioning.
5. Support persons for child witnesses.
6. Sequestration or exclusion of witnesses during the child's testimony.
7. Closing the courtroom to the public and the press.
8. Video-link technology and other modifications that impact the accused's
right to confront the child.
9. Counsel or guardian ad litem for the child.
10. Corroboration of children's testimony.
11. Jury instructions regarding child witnesses.
12. The residual category.
These reforms are discussed in the remainder of this Article.
1. Children's Hearsay Statements
Children disclose sexual abuse to parents, teachers, medical and mental health
professionals, friends, and others. In many cases, children's disclosures are powerful
evidence of abuse. Yet, such out-of-court statements are hearsay, and hearsay is
disallowed in Anglo-American legal proceedings unless the statement meets the
requirements of an exception to the rule against hearsay. In civil law countries,
hearsay is generally admissible.
Children's hearsay statements are critical for three reasons. First, these state-
ments are often the most compelling evidence of abuse. As one court put it, "[i]n
such cases, the need for the victim's out-of-court statements about the crime is likely
to be great." 69 Second, in many cases the need for the child's hearsay is magnified
by the paucity of medical and corroborating evidence. 0 As the Supreme Court
observed, "[c]hild abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute,
in large part because there often are no witnesses except for the victim. ' 71 Finally,
although most children possess the capacity to testify in court, some are ineffective
witnesses, and others are too frightened or traumatized to take the stand. For a child
69. Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1993).
70. Medical and laboratory evidence exists in only a small fraction of child sexual abuse cases. See ELLEN
GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 91 (1993) ("In the majority of the cases,
there was no medical evidence .... ); Jan Bays & David Chadwick, Medical Diagnosis of the Sexually Abused
Child, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 91, 92 (1993) ("A normal physical exam is common in child sexual abuse
... "); Martin A. Finkel & Allan R. Delong, Medical Findings in Child Sexual Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 185, 201 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994) ("Acute genital and anal injuries are
infrequent....").
71. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,60 (1987).
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who cannot testify, out-of-court statements are the child's only way to communicate
with the judge or jury. For a child who testifies but performs poorly, earlier
disclosures-although usually hearsay-may bolster the child's credibility.
Although numerous exceptions exist to the hearsay rule, only a handful play a
major role in criminal child abuse litigation. The "excited utterance" exception
allows hearsay statements made shortly following startling events.!2 All U.S. juris-
dictions, England, Scotland, and other common law countries recognize the excited
utterance exception.73 Another important exception is the medical diagnosis or treat-
ment exception that allows admission of certain hearsay statements made to medical
personnel.74 Most U.S. jurisdictions have a version of the medical exception. 7 k
majority of the United States also has residual or catchall exceptions that allow
admission of reliable hearsay that does not meet the requirements of one of the more
traditional exceptions, such as excited utterance! 6 The residual exceptions play an
important role in child abuse litigation.
77
'
Until 1982, hearsay exceptions did not, for the most part,78 draw lines based on
age. An excited utterance was an excited utterance whether spoken by a child or an
adult.79 Beginning in Washington State in 1982, however, an increasing number of
U.S. states adopted hearsay exceptions for children's statements describing sexual
abuse.80 Today, a small majority of American states have special "child hearsay
exceptions."8 With the Criminal Evidence Act of 1992, Ireland's Oireachtas enacted
a child hearsay exception for certain video recorded statements.82 The Child Witness
72. See FED. R. EviD. 803(2).
73. See SCOTrISH LAw COMMItsSSiON, THE EVIDENCE OF CHILDREN AND OTHER POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE
WrNESSES (1988); SPENCER &FLIN, supra note 8. at 131-32.
74. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
75. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE:
STATE ADAPTATIONS OFTHE FEDERAL RULES OFEVIDENCE (1994); see also CAL EVID. CODE § 1253 (West Supp.
1996).
76. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 805(b)(5).
77. See cases collected in MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, §§ 7.43-7.45.
78. Prior to 1982, at least one state, Michigan, had a common law hearsay exception for the out-of-court
statements of young sexual assault victims. This so-called "tender years exception" had its origins in People v.
Gage, 28 N.W. 835 (1886). However, when Michigan adopted its version of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
tender years exception was not included, and, in People v. Kreiner, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982), the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the tender years exception was no longer part of Michigan law.
79. In deciding on the admissibility of hearsay, judges do not ignore age differences. See MYERS, EVIDENCE
IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, §§ 7.30,7.31,7.36,7.44.
80. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1996).
81. See IV NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 41, at Child
Witnesses tab. 22. In 1994, the California Legislature enacted a child hearsay exception for criminal cases. See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995). Also in 1994, the California Court of Appeal created a child hearsay exception
for dependency cases in juvenile court. See In re Carmen 0., 28 Cal. App. 4th 908, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (1994).
82. Section 16 of the Ireland Criminal Evidence Act provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2)-
(a) a videorecording of any evidence given by a person under 17 years of age through a
live television link at the preliminary examination of an offense to which this Part
applies [sex offenses], and
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Code at the end of this Article contains an exception modeled on the Washington
child hearsay provision.
In the United States, the hearsay rule applies in noncriminal as well as criminal
proceedings. With this in mind, some American states have special hearsay
exceptions that allow the admission of hearsay in juvenile court protective pro-
ceedings. In England, "any civil court that is concerned with the welfare of a child
may now receive and act on hearsay evidence." 84 In Scotland, the Civil Evidence Act
of 1988 "abolished the hearsay rule in relation to civil cases."
' 85
2. Competence to Testify and the Oath
To testify as a witness a person must possess the cognitive and moral capacities
that comprise testimonial competence. 86 In addition, the person must take a religious
oath or a secular affirmation. Although it is common to speak in one breath of
competence and the oath, as though they were a single requirement, they are separate
and distinct.
(b) a videorecording of any statement made by a person under 14 years of age (being a
person in respect of whom such an offense is alleged to have been committed) during
an interview with a member of the Garda Siochana or any other person who is
competent for the purpose, shall be admissible at the trial of the offence as evidence
of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible:
Provided that, in the case of a videorecording mentioned in paragraph (b), either-
(i) it has been considered in accordance with section 15 (2) by the judge of the
District Court conducting the preliminary examination of the offence, or
(ii) the person whose statement was videorecorded is available at the trial for
cross-examination.
(2) (a) Any such videorecording or any part thereof shall not be admitted in evidence as
aforesaid if the court is of opinion that in the interests of justice the video recording
concerned or that part ought not to be so admitted.
(b) In considering whether in the interests of justice such video recording or any part
thereof ought not to be admitted in evidence, the court shall have regard to all the
circumstances, including any risk that its admission will result in unfairness to the
accused or, if there is more than one, to any of them.
(3) In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to any statement contained in such a
videorecording regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference
can reasonably be drawn as to its accuracy or otherwise.
(4) In this section "statement" includes any representation of fact, whether in words or
otherwise.
Ireland Criminal Evidence Act § 16 (1992).
83. See, e.g., In re Carmen 0., 28 Cal. App. 4th 908,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (1994).
84. SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8, at 146.
85. See Rhona Flin, Brian Kearney & Kathleen Murray, Children's Evidence: Scottish Research and Law,
in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 114, 120
[hereinafter Flin et al., Children's Evidence].
86. See generally MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, §§ 2.10-2.15; 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 601 [04] (1995).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 603.
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a. Testimonial Competence
A prospective witness-child or adult-must be testimonially competent.8 8 The
individual must have sufficient memory to recall events,89 must be able to com-
municate intelligibly,9° must apprehend the difference between truth and lies,91 and
must comprehend the duty to testify truthfully.
9 2
The law of children's testimonial competence has an interesting history in
common law countries. 93 As long ago as 1779, an English court ruled that there is no
arbitrary age below which children are automatically incompetent to testify?4 In
1895, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the competence of a five-year-old who
watched his father shotgunned to death before his eyes. 95 The Court stated:
That the boy was not by reason of his youth, as a matter of law, absolutely
disqualified as a witness, is clear. While no one would think of calling as a
witness an infant only two or three years old, there is no precise age which
determines the question of competency. This depends on the capacity and
intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former.96
Although in 1895 the Supreme Court dismissed the idea of two- or three-year-old
witnesses, today, a century later, a few children this young are found competent.
97
Certainly, by age five, most children possess the cognitive and moral capacity to
testify.
In the United States there are three approaches to determining children's testi-
monial competence. First, a diminishing number of states adhere to what may be
called the traditional approach, in which children below a specified age-typically
88. For general discussion of children's testimonial competence, see MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE,
supra note 13, at 59-136.
89. See id. § 2.11; Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Testify, 5 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 73, 75
(1981).
90. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 2.12.
91. See Ricketts v. State, 488 A.2d 856,857 (Del. 1985) (six-year-old did not understand concept of perjury,
but knew the difference between truth and falsehood; child competent); see also MYERS, supra note 13, § 2.14
(listing authorities).
92. See Swanigan v. Board of Educ., 527 N.E.2d 1030. 1032 (111. App. CL 1988); see also MYERS,
EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 2.15 (listing authorities).
93. See SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8, at 46-74; see also MYERS, supra note 13, § 2.2.
94. See Rex v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). For a detailed analysis of Brasier, see SPENCER &FLIN,
supra note 8, at 48.
95. See Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895).
96. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524.
97. See State v. Hussey, 521 A.2d 278,281 (Me. 1987); State v. Hunsaker, 693 P.2d 724,726 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984); see also MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 2.1 n.2 (collecting competence cases
by age).
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10, 12, or 14-are presumed incompetent.98 Before a presumptively incompetent
child may testify, the judge conducts a competency examination, during which the
judge questions the youngster to assess memory, comprehension of the difference
between truth and lies, and appreciation of the duty to testify truthfully.99 If the judge
is persuaded that the child possesses the necessary capacity, the child is permitted to
testify.
The second approach to testimonial competence abandons arbitrary age limits
and holds that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness." t  Under this
approach-which now predominates in the United States-many children are per-
mitted to testify without a preliminary competency examination. Despite the
apparently all-inclusive "every person is competent" language of prevailing law,
however, judges continue holding competency examinations when legitimate
questions arise about individual children. t1
The third approach to testimonial competence is evidenced in a small number of
American states that have laws designed to ensure that victims of child abuse testify
without preliminary examination.'0 2 For example, Alabama's statute states that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, a child victim of
a physical offense, sexual offense, or sexual exploitation, shall be considered a com-
petent witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any
judicial proceeding.'103
In England, the law regarding testimonial competence has been relaxed, and
most children are permitted to testify in criminal and noncriminal proceedings.104
"The modem Scottish rule.., is that all persons capable of making themselves
intelligible to the tribunal are competent as witnesses, oaths being required of those
who have sufficient understanding, and dispensed with for those who do not."'' 5 In
Canada, "a child who cannot swear an oath, but who is able to communicate the
evidence [is permitted] to testify on a 'promise to tell the truth." '1 6 In Australia, a
child who cannot take an oath may nevertheless testify.0 7 In Ireland, "the evidence
of a person under 14 years of age may be received otherwise than on oath or affir-
98. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 2.8.
99. For a discussion of the competency examination, see MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note
13, § 2.18.
100. FED. R.EVID. 601.
101. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989); see also MYERS, EVIDENCEIN CHILD ABUSE, supra note
13, §§ 2.3 -2A.
102. See MYERS, EvmENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 2.9.
103. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3(c) (1994).
104. See SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8, at 50-54, 58-70.
105. Id. at 66.
106. Louise Dezwirek Sas, David A. Wolfe & Kevin Gowdey, Children and the Courts in Canada, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 77, 81 [hereinafter
Sas et a]., Children and the Courts in Canada].
107. See Sandra Shrimpton, Kim Oates & Susan Hayes, The Child Witness and Legal Reforms in Australia,
in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 132.
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mation if the court is satisfied that he is capable of giving an intelligible account of
events .... "'0
b. The Oath or Affirmation
In addition to possessing the cognitive and moral capacity to testify, a witness
in the United States must take an oath or affirmation. 19 The oath is religious, and
before a witness can meaningfully answer the question, "Do'you solemnly swear to
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?" the
witness must appreciate the divine penalty awaiting perjurers. As an alternative to a
religious oath, a witness may make an affirmation, which is a secular declaration that
the witness will testify truthfully.
Needless to say, few young children fully grasp the religious implications of the
traditional oath. To appreciate children's developing comprehension of religious
teachings, consider the following conversation between brothers aged four and six:
4-year-old: You know, if you die you go up to heaven.
6-year-old: I wouldn't want to go up to heaven.
4-year-old: Why? Are you afraid of heights?
Although children do not fully comprehend the religious oath, they do
understand promises. Moreover, children appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
Increasingly today, judges in the United States take the sensible approach of simply
asking young witnesses to promise to tell the truth. In England, Ireland, Scotland,
and civil law countries, children may testify unsworn."'
3. Altering the Courtroom to Accommodate Child Witnesses
The courtroom is a forbidding place to children."' Is it permissible to tinker with
the solemn halls of justice to accommodate young witnesses? Elsewhere I have
traced the historical origins of the physical layout of today's courtroom and have
concluded that "the configuration of the modern courtroom is not cast in stone. If
altering the furnishings or formalities of the courtroom will make children more
comfortable and improve their testimony, nothing in law or the Constitution forbids
108. Ireland Criminal Evidence Act § 27(1) (1992).
109. See FED. R. EvtD. 603.
110. See 6 HALSBURY'S STATUrES OFENGLAND AND WALES 515 (1992) (Children Act, § 96 (1989)); see also
Ireland Criminal Evidence Act § 27(1) (1992); SPENCER &FLIN, supra note 8, at 58-70.
111. See MURRAY, supra note 68, at ii; Graham Davies & Helen Westcott, The Child Witness in the
Courtroom: Empowerment or Protection?, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WrrNESS, supra note 60,
at 199; Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 1.
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circumspect modification that does not compromise the seriousness of the pro-
ceeding.""t2 The law does not preordain that courtrooms be configured in a particular
way, and, as long as the defendant's right to a fair trial is protected, alterations to
accommodate children are proper."1
3
Judges have inherent authority to accommodate child witnesses."t 4 The Alaska
Supreme Court observed that "the rules of evidence were not developed to handle the
problems presented by the child witness. Therefore our courts must be free to adapt
these rules, where appropriate, to accommodate these unique cases."" 5 In an
enlightened decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered a trial
judge's decision to alter the courtroom for young witnesses in a day care sexual
abuse case.' t6 The court wrote:
At trial, the judge allowed the child witnesses to testify from a child-sized
table and chair placed in front of the jury box. The judge and questioning
attorneys sat around the table. The defendant sat at counsel table. The child
was allowed to bring a toy into the courtroom and had a parent sit behind
him or her. The judge instructed the attorneys to make objections quietly
into a microphone during a child's testimony. The judge ruled on the
objections immediately and heard arguments based on the objections after
the testimony.
On appeal, the defendant makes a broad objection to the inability of counsel
effectively to register valid objections and the prejudicial nature of the
courtroom set-up, and argues that he was thereby deprived of his rights to
effective assistance of counsel and to a fair trial.... We find no error.
A judge is afforded wide discretion in fashioning procedures and modifying
standard trial practices to accommodate the special needs of child witnesses.
... We have recognized the plight of child sexual abuse victims, and the
difficulties a particular child may face in trying to testify in a traditional
courtroom setting .... "[A] judge may require that the environment in which
a witness is to give testimony be made less formal and intimidating...."
The judge here protected the child witnesses to the extent possible while also
safeguarding the defendant's rights. The judge permitted defense counsel to
confer with each other and with the defendant and then to return to the
112. John E.B. Myers, Steps Toward Forensically Relevant Research, in 57 MONOGRAPHS OFTHE SOCIETY
FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 143, 148 (1992).
113. See Hicks-Bey v. United States, 649 A.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 251 (1995).
114. See State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338, 1345 (Fla. 1993).
115. In re T.P., 838 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Alaska 1992).
116. See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 535 N.E.2d 193 (Mass. 1989).
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witness with additional questions following the conferences. Furthermore,
the judge explained the special practices to the jury to avoid any possible
prejudice to the defendant. The defendant's right to a fair trial and assistance
of counsel were not compromised.!
1 7
American judges have approved a variety of accommodations for children!
Thus, the witness chair may be turned slightly away from the defendant, provided the
defendant can observe the child testify." 9 In United States v. Romey,' 20 a child
witness was allowed to whisper her answers to her mother, who repeated them aloud.
In another case "the prosecutor positioned herself in the courtroom so that one of the
young victim witnesses, Tammy G., did not have to look at [the defendant] while
testifying about his acts of sexual molestation.... [T]he prosecutor sat or stood next
to the witness stand so Tammy could look away from the defense table while she was
testifying."'' The defendant complained that this procedure violated his right under
the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution to confront the child, but the
California Court of Appeal disagreed, writing that:
[t]he mere fact that the prosecutor facilitated Tammy's decision to look
away from [defendant] does not transform this innocuous act into a violation
of the confrontation clause.
A contrary holding would border on the absurd. Surely, [defendant] cannot
be claiming a constitutional right to stare down or otherwise subtly
intimidate a young child who would dare to testify against him. Nor can he
claim a right to a particular seating arrangement in the courtroom.
22
Legislators as well as judges have been active regarding courtroom accom-
modations for children. For example, Connecticut has a statute that authorizes the
117. Amirault, 535 N.E.2d at 207.
118. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 8.3 (collecting cases).
119, See United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 289,290 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Tompson, 31 MJ. 168,
170 (C.M.A. 1990).
120. 32 M.J. 180, 183 (C.M.A. 1991).
121. People v. Sharp, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1772, 1777, 1780,36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 120, 122 (1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2006 (1995).
122. Id. at 1782, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123.
123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12A5.046(f) (Michie 1995). This statute provides:
If the court does not find under (a)(2) of this section that the testimony by the child victim or
witness under normal court procedures will result in the child's inability to effectively communicate,
the court may, after taking into consideration the factors specified in (b) of this section, supervise the
spatial arrangements of the courtroom and the location, movement, and deportment of all persons in
attendance so as to safeguard the child from emotional harm or stress. In addition to other procedures
it finds appropriate, the court may
(1) allow the child to testify while sitting on the floor or on an appropriately sized chair;
(2) schedule the procedure in a room that provides adequate privacy, freedom from distractions,
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judge to prohibit people from entering or leaving the courtroom during a child's
testimony.' 24 Another Connecticut law states that the judge may require attorneys to
remain seated during questioning and may instruct attorneys to make objections "in
a manner which is not intimidating to the child."' 5 A California law states that "the
taking of the child's testimony may be limited to the hours during which the child is
normally in school."'1 Another California statute states that a child "may be allowed
reasonable periods of relief from examination and cross-examination during which
he or she may retire from the courtroom."' 27 Iowa law states that "[a] court may,
upon its own motion or upon the motion of a party, order the court testimony of a
child to be limited in duration in accordance with the developmental maturity of the
child."' ' A California statute provides that "[i]n the court's discretion the judge,
parties, witnesses, support person, and court personnel may be relocated within the
courtroom to facilitate a more comfortable and personal environment for the child
witness." 129 West Virginia law states that "the court may permit a child who is eleven
years old or less to use anatomically correct dolls, mannequins or drawings to assist
such child in testifying."' 30 An Alabama statute provides that "the court may allow
informality, and comfort appropriate to the child's developmental age; and
(3) order a recess when the energy, comfort, or attention span of the child warrants.
Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.8 (Vest Supp. 1996) ("[Ihe court shall take special precautions to provide for
the comfort and support of the minor and to protect the minor from coercion, intimidation, or undue influence as
a witness.....); id. § 868.8(b) (West Supp. 1996) ("[I]n his or her discretion, the judge may remove his or her robe
if the judge believes that this formal attire intimidates the minor .. "); id. § 868.8(c) (Vest Supp. 1996) ("In the
court's discretion, the judge, parties, witnesses, support persons, and court personnel may be relocated within the
courtroom to facilitate a more comfortable and personal environment for the child witness .... ); IDAHO CODE §
19-110 (1994) (limiting continuances and requiring court to "consider and give weight to any adverse impact that
the requested delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a child victim or witness"); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
642-a4 (McKinney 1996) ("The judge presiding should be sensitive to the psychological and emotional stress a
child witness may undergo when testifying."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(B)(3) (Law Co-op. 1993) ("The court
shall provide the victim or witness courthouse waiting areas that are separate from those that will be used by the
defendant, his or her family, or friends."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10A6.085 (Vest 1994) (limiting
continuances).
124. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86G(b)(1) (West 1994), which provides that in criminal child abuse
cases "fpjersons shall be prohibited from entering or leaving the courtroom during the child's testimony."
125. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86G(b)(4) (West 1994), which provides that in criminal child abuse
cases "the attorneys for the defendant and for the state shall question the child while seated at a table positioned
in front of the child, shall remain seated while posing objections and shall ask questions and pose objections in a
manner which is not intimidating to the child."
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.8(d) (West Supp. 1996).
127. Id. § 868.8(a) (West Supp. 1996).
128. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.144 (West 1994). The statute goes on to state:
The court may consider or hear expert testimony in order to determine the appropriate limitation on the
duration of a child's testimony. However, the court shall, upon motion, limit the duration of a child's
uninterrupted testimony to one hour, at which time the court shall allow the child to rest before
continuing to testify.
Id.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.8(c) (West Supp. 1995).
130. W. VA. CODE § 61-8-13(b) (1995); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(b)(3) (Vest 1994) ("[IThe use
of anatomically correct dolls by the child shall be permitted...."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642-a7 (McKinney 1994)
("A child witness should be permitted in the discretion of the court to use anatomically correct dolls and drawings
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leading questions at trial by the prosecution or defense of any victim or witness in
a case who is under the age of 1O.''s Although a judge would have inherent judicial
authority to implement all the accommodations listed above and more, a legislative
pronouncement gives judges guidance and confidence to approve accommodations.
There are limits, of course, to accommodating children, particularly in criminal
cases. In Duffitt v. State,32 for example, the Indiana Supreme Court disapproved a
trial judge's decision to put posters on the courtroom walls. The Indiana court wrote
that "the practice of decorating in deference to [a] certain witness is altogether
inappropriate.' ' 33 In State v. Michaels,134 the trial judge went too far when he allowed
young children to sit on his knee while they testified. And in State v. R. W.,135 the trial
judge told the child witness she would receive ice cream if she told what was "real."
At the conclusion of her direct examination, the youngster refused to be cross-
examined until she received the promised treat. The ice cream was delivered in the
presence of the jury, and the New Jersey Supreme Court stated "without hesitation
that the trial judge abused his discretion by promising the child ice cream and in
subsequently giving it to her, thereby suggesting to the jury, albeit inadvertently, that
the infant had indeed testified truthfully.' 36
Although limits are necessary on accommodations for children, some courts
seem remarkably insensitive to children's needs. In State v. Palabay, t37 for example,
the Hawaii Court of Appeal ruled that a twelve-year-old should not be permitted to
hold a teddy bear while testifying unless the state first demonstrated a compelling
justification for this simple accommodation. One wonders if the Hawaii court would
deny a Kleenex to a weeping adult rape victim absent a showing of compelling need.
during his testimony ...."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-408(f) (Michie 1995).
Children unable to articulate what was done to them will be permitted to demonstrate the sexual act or
acts committed against them with the aid of anatomically correct dolls. Such demonstrations will be
under the supervision of the court and shall be videotaped at trial, and shall be received into evidence
as demonstrative evidence ...
Id.
131. ALA. CODE § 15-25-1 (1995). Judges routinely allow leading questions during the direct examination
of children. See MYERS, EVnMENCE IN CHD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 5.7 (collecting cases); see, e.g., United States
v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 547 (7th Cir. 1995). The Boyles court wrote:
[Tihe government used leading questions when examining Matthew, but the government's action in
doing so was entirely proper because the questions helped to elicit difficult testimony from an infant,
and they aided the court in its search for the truth in this most trying situation. This court has recognized
that when dealing with infant and children witnesses, "procedural requirements-such as absence of
leading questions-may 'in many instances be inappropriate or unnecessary to a determination whether
a given statement is sufficiently trustworthy."'
Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
132. 525 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. 1988).
133. Duffitt, 525 N.E.2d at 608.
134. 625 A.2d 489 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
135. 514 A.2d 1287, 1289 n.I (NJ. 1986).
136. R.W., 514 A.2d at 1289 n.1.
137. 844 P.2d 1 (Haw. CL App. 1992).
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Minor changes in the courtroom may be anything but minor for children. The
Child Witness Code at the end of this Article emphasizes the importance of such
accommodations.
4. Judicial Control of the Proceedings and Questioning
The judge has authority to control the proceedings and interrogation of wit-
nesses. In the United States, Rule 611 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is typical
of statutes on this subject, and states:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harass-
ment or undue embarrassment.
Several states have laws specifically addressing the judge's authority to protect
child witnesses. A New York statute provides that "[t]he judge presiding should be
sensitive to the psychological and emotional stress a child witness may undergo
when testifying."'138 A California law states that in sex offense cases "the court shall
consider the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is necessary, within
existing budgetary resources, and constitutionally permissible to prevent psycho-
logical harm to the child victim.' '139 California law specifically states that:
[w]ith a witness under the age of 14, the court shall take special care to
protect him or her from undue harassment or embarrassment, and to restrict
the unnecessary repetition of questions. The court shall also take special care
to insure that questions are stated in a form which is appropriate to the age
of the witness. The court may in the interests of justice, on objection by a
party, forbid the asking of a question which is in a form that is not
reasonably likely to be understood by a person of the age of the witness.
140
The California statute regarding developmentally inappropriate questions is
particularly important in light of attorneys' inexhaustible appetite for incompre-
hensible queries. 141 Defense attorneys tend to ask more confusing and age-
138. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642-a4 (McKinney 1996).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (West Supp. 1996).
140. CAL. EVm. CODE § 765(b) (West 1995).
141. See MARK BRENNAN & ROSLIN E. BRENNAN, STRANGE LANGUAGE-CHILD VICTIMS UNDER CROSS
EXAMiNATION (3d ed. 1989); WALKER, supra note 26.
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inappropriate questions than prosecutors. i42 Kathleen Murray reported that cross-
examiners in Scotland "could rarely resist exploiting the immaturity of the children
and by a combination of language devices and questioning styles tried systematically
to destroy their credibility. '1 43 Moreover, defense counsel concentrate more often
than prosecutors on peripheral matters.' 44 The following four examples from actual
trials illustrate the problem of developmentally inappropriate questions:
Q: On the evening of January third, you did, didn't you, visit your
grandmother's sisters' house and didn't you see the defendant leave the
house at 7:30, after which you stayed the night?' 45
Q: Well, I have jumped ahead a bit, so you will have to go back to what
you were telling us about before that first incident. You told us of what
you did and what he did to you. On the next occasion you went there,
what kind of thing happened between you?
46
Q: Now on that day when your mother and Shelley came up were you there
when your mother was discussing a possible job up in the North of
England?
A: I am not sure.
Q: Was there a time when you suffered from eczema? 47
Q: Well I know, I understand what you say. You have been talking to her
today but you see, what I am asking you is this. That statement suggests
142. See Rhona Flin, Ray Bull, Julian Boon & Anne Knox, Child Witnesses in Scottish Criminal Trials, 2
INT'L J. VICTMIOLOGY 309, 326 (1993). The authors wrote:
In terms of the language used, again little difference was found between the prosecution and the
defense lawyers. No significant difference was found in the age appropriateness of the vocabulary used
in questioning. However, significant differences were found with respect to the age appropriateness of
the grammatical structures. These indicated that on average the prosecution lawyers were more
successful in putting questions during the examination-in-chief at levels which the children could
understand than were the defense lawyers during their cross-examinations.
Id.; see Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 80 (noting that defense attomeys used "more age-
inappropriate wording of questions"); id. at 88-89.
143. MURRAY, supra note 68, at 96.
144. See Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 80 ("The defense attorney, however, was judged to
focus more on information peripheral or irrelevant to the assault ...."); see also id. at 88-89.
145. Saywitz & Snyder, supra note 61.
146. Vicky K. Kranat & Helen L. Westcott, Under Fire: Lawyers Questioning Children in Criminal Courts,
3 Ex1ERTEVIDENCE 16,21 (1994). The authors wondered aloud why attorneys are permitted to ask incomprehen-
sible, highly leading questions in court, while police and social workers are criticized when they ask mildly leading
questions during investigative interviews. Id. They wrote that "[i]t is difficult to reconcile lawyers' freedom to
question children (in any way they like) once they are in the courtroom with the restrictions now imposed upon
those who question children before they reach court." Id.
147. Id.
1996/Steps Toward A Child Witness Code
that you said those things that you now say are wrong to the police. Now
did you say it to the police or did you not? 41
Is it any wonder children get confused? Judges have ample authority to stop such
nonsense.
A judge has authority to forbid unduly embarrassing questions. 49 In the context
of child sexual abuse, however, the nature of the crime often makes embarrassing
questions necessary. The judge may disallow cross-examination on irrelevant issues,
and may forbid confusing, misleading, ambiguous, and unintelligible questions.50
Finally, the judge has authority to curtail questions designed merely to harass or
badger a witness.'s
Although judges have authority to control cross-examination, judges in the
adversary system are typically reluctant to interfere. Within broad parameters,
attorneys have the right to question witnesses as they see fit. Judges are particularly
deferential to defense counsel's right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, in-
cluding children. The Irish Law Reform Commission aptly observed that "[]on-
frontation and cross-examination are indelible characteristics of the adversarial
system as normally operated."' 5 2 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the right of
defense counsel to cross-examine is protected by the U.S. Constitution.153 "[T]he
cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the
witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been
allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness."' 4 The Supreme Court of Ireland
reached a similar conclusion under its constitution, writing that "an accused person
has a right to cross-examine every witness for the prosecution .... 155
Attorneys place extraordinary confidence in cross-examination to uncover the
truth and, in particular, unmask the liar. John Spencer and Rhona Flin observed that
"[a]mong English-speaking lawyers no belief is more deeply held than the value of
cross-examination. It has been the subject of fervent professions of faith in so many
speeches and writings that a collection of them would fill a sizeable book."'5 6
American legal scholar John H. Wigmore opined that cross-examination "is beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.'
148. BRENNAN & BRENNAN, supra note 14 1.
149. See FED. R. EVID. 61 l(a)(3).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. IRISH LAW REFORM COMMISSION, A LAW REFORM COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 146 (1989) [hereinafter IRISH LAW REFORM COMMISSION].
153. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308. 315 (1974).
154. Id. at 316.
155. In re Haughey, [1971] I.R. 217, 260.
156. SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8. at 270.
157. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
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Not everyone genuflects before the alter of cross-examination. Some European
lawyers and judges are less enthusiastic. Spencer and Flin wrote:
If we really want to know what foreign lawyers think of cross-examination
we should read what a distinguished French judge and legal writer, Francois
Grophe, had to say about it:
The Anglo-American system has grave faults which cry out for it to
be abolished. In the first place, it over-uses the right of questioning,
to which it attributes an exaggerated efficiency in the case of
suspect witnesses, whilst paying insufficient respect to witnesses
who are sincere. Even more deplorably, it takes absolutely no
precautions against the witness being influenced, or even badgered,
and it takes no account of the distorting effect of suggestive
questions, which get worse as the case is more bitterly contested.
This, as Schneikert says, is 'the best means of working upon
witnesses and leading them astray.' Wouldn't the wretched witness
have to be made of marble to stay calm and unruffled under the
cross-fire of interrogation and counter-interrogation, examination,
cross-examination, and re-examination which he must endure at the
hand of the two adversarial opponents? Just think of a frightened
witness, a weak one, or a child having to give evidence under such
conditions! In reality, truth and justice cannot see the light of day
except in an atmosphere of calmness and serenity.'58
From the perspective of the adversary system, Judge Grophe's stinging criticism
of cross-examination is interesting, but rather beside the point. Cross-examination
is so thoroughly ensconced in the adversary system that the only hope for more
humane treatment of children is to pare away clear abuses. The statutes cited earlier
in this Section are steps in the right direction, and the Child Witness Code at the end
of this Article places limits on inappropriate questioning.
5. Support Persons for Child Witnesses
Imagine five-year-old Susie, about to enter the hospital for the first time in her
life. Susie is scheduled to undergo an unfamiliar and painful medical procedure.
Mother drives Susie to the hospital, opens the car door, and says, "Okay honey, run
along into the hospital and find the doctor. I'll be back in a couple of hours to pick
you up. Bye." Mother drives off, leaving little Susie standing all alone outside the
158. FRANCOIS GROPHE, LA CRITIQUE DU TEMOIGNAGE 90 (2d ed. 1927). quoted in SPENCER & FLIN, supra
note 8, at 271.
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hospital. Preposterous you say? Mother won't do that. She'll walk Susie into the
hospital and remain at her side to provide comfort, reassurance, and support.
Moreover, the nurses and doctors understand the importance of emotional support
for young patients and, unless there is some overriding medical reason to exclude
mother during the procedure, she is welcome.
Now change the scene from the hospital to the courthouse. Susie is about to enter
a courtroom for the first time, where she is to testify in the trial of the man accused
of molesting her. Just as Susie's mother did not abandon her at the hospital, mother
accompanies Susie to court. Mother holds Susie's hand as they approach the
courtroom. At the door, however, Susie's mother is told she cannot go in. All by
herself, Susie is required to step into the huge room. She can feel the stares of
unfamiliar grown-ups. Most of all, though, she feels the piercing gaze of the one
adult she knows too well, the defendant. The bailiff points to the witness stand and
says, "Take a seat up there." Susie inches her way to the witness box and sits down.
She can barely see over the rail around the box, and her feet dangle far above the
floor. For a moment she lifts her eyes, only to drop them when she sees the defendant
sitting a few feet away.
At the hospital, emotional support is an integral part of treatment, and parents are
partners in therapy. At the courthouse, however, things are different. The tradition
in court is that the child must go it alone. Fortunately, this tradition is giving way to
a more enlightened approach. An increasing number of states have laws that allow
support for children testifying in court. 59 A sample of these laws follows:
When a child is summoned as a witness in any hearing in any criminal
matter, including any preliminary hearing, notwithstanding any other
statutory provision, parents, a counselor, friend or other person having a
supportive relationship with the child shall be allowed to remain in the
courtroom at the witness stand with the child during the child's testimony
159. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(1) (West 1995); CAL. PENALCODE § 868.5 (West 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 16-42-102 (Michie 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(b) (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5134(b)
(1994); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621-28 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-3023 (1995); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2163a(4) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.046 (West 1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642-a6 (McKinney
1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-9(2) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69A.030(8) (West 1994).
The prosecuting attorney often provides important support for child witnesses. The prosecutor should not,
however, serve the role of support person. Sexton v. Howard, 55 F.3d 1557 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 936 (1996) was a habeas corpus case. In state court, the defendant was convicted of raping and sodomizing his
four-year-old daughter, who was five at the time of trial. Throughout the child's testimony,
Chief Deputy District Attorney Ellen Brooks sat on the witness stand with her. Over defense counsel's
objection, Brooks conducted the direct and redirect examinations of Amy while Amy was either sitting
on her lap or sitting next to her on the stand, and Brooks continued to sit with Amy on the witness stand
while defense counsel cross-examined her.
Id. at 1558. Although the state and federal courts did not approve of the prosecutor's conduct, the conviction was
upheld.
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unless in written findings made and entered, the court finds that the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a fair trial will be unduly prejudiced.16
A child victim or witness is entitled to be accompanied, in all proceedings,
by a "friend" or other person in whom the child trusts, which person shall
be permitted to advise the judge, when appropriate and as a friend of the
Court, regarding the child's ability to understand proceedings and
161questions.
A child testifying at or attending a judicial proceeding shall have the right
to be accompanied by an adult attendant to provide emotional support to the
child. The court, at its discretion, may allow the adult attendant to remain in
close physical proximity to or in contact with the child while the child
testifies. The court may allow the adult attendant to hold the child's hand or
allow the child to sit on the adult attendant's lap throughout the course of the
proceeding. An adult attendant shall not provide the child with an answer to
any question directed to the child during the course of the child's testimony
or otherwise prompt the child.' 62
[Ain adult who is known to the child and with whom the child feels
comfortable shall be permitted to sit in close proximity to the child during
the child's testimony, provided such person shall not obscure the child from
the view of the defendant or the trier of fact.
163
[A] person supportive of the "child witness" or "special witness".., should
be permitted to be present and accessible to a child witness at all times
during his testimony, although the person supportive of the child witness
should not be permitted to influence the child's testimony.
t64
A witness who is called upon to testify shall be permitted to have a support
person sit with, accompany, or be in close proximity to the witness during
his or her testimony.' 65
Emotional support is not only humane, it is effective. Gail Goodman and her
colleagues conducted research on children testifying in American criminal trials.'66
The research disclosed that the presence of a supportive adult increases some
160. IDAHO CODE § 19-3023 (1995).
161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5134(b) (1994).
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(1) (West 1995).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(b)(2) (West 1994).
164. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642-a6 (McKinney 1995).
165. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(4) (West 1995).
166. See Testifyhg in Criminal Court, supra note 3.
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children's capacity to testify. Goodman found that during trial testimony, "[p]resence
of a parent/loved one was associated with children answering more questions during
direct examination."'167 During testimony at preliminary hearings, children whose
nonoffending parent or loved one remained in the courtroom outperformed children
who were not similarly supported.'6Children who received emotional support "were
judged less frightened of the defendant throughout their testimony .... Also, during
the defense attorney's questioning, children whose parent/loved one remained in
court were also less likely to provide inconsistent testimony regarding peripheral
details and more likely to be judged credible witnesses." 69 Presence in the courtroom
of a supportive adult "was associated with the child being less likely to recant the
identity of the perpetrator, and less likely to recant main actions of the perpetrator
,,170during defense questioning ....
During the past decade, the most hotly-debated, legislated, and litigated court-
room reform has been testimony via live television link. It is rather ironic that so
much attention has focused on "high tech" reforms like video testimony when more
good is likely to flow from the decidedly "low tech" idea of allowing a child witness
to see a friendly face in the courtroom.
6. Excluding Witnesses While They Are Not Testifying
Witnesses may be excluded from the courtroom while they are not testifying.17 1
The purpose of exclusion is to prevent witnesses from shaping their testimony in
light of what others say.172 The practice goes back at least to the Old Testament,
when Susanna was convicted and sentenced to die based on testimony from two of
the elders. Before Susanna could be executed, however, Daniel rose to her defense.
Daniel said, "Are ye such fools, ye sons of Israel, that without examination or know-
ledge of the truth ye have condemned a daughter of Israel? Return again to the place
of judgment: for they have borne false witness against her." Daniel prepared to cross-
examine the accusing elders but before he started he said, "Put these two aside one
far from another, and I will examine them." Once the elders were separated they told
inconsistent stories and their perjury was revealed. 73
The rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom has changed little since biblical
times, and Kirkpatrick and Mueller described its modern justification:
Excluding witnesses serves two main purposes. The first is to prevent testi-
mony by one witness from being tailored by what he hears in testimony by
167. Id. at 92.
168. See id. at 85 (outperformed from the prosecution's perspective).
169. Id. at 85.
170. Id.
171. See FED. R. EVID. 615.
172. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 8.2.
173. See Prophecy of Daniel 13:34-59.
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another. Where one of two witnesses called by the same party and generally
in sympathy with the cause hears testimony by the other, the one may con-
sciously or subconsciously mold his testimony into greater consistency with
that of the other, or his memory may be unconsciously shaped by what he
has heard. Where the sympathies of the witness are aligned with opposing
sides, similar distortions may occur, this time increasing conflicts and incon-
sistencies between stories. The second reason is to assist the parties in detec-
ting error or falsehood by the witness .... 274
In child abuse litigation the exclusion rule becomes important when a child needs
the supportive presence of an adult who is also a witness, and who normally would
be excluded from the courtroom during the child's testimony. 75 In some cases the
prosecutor may arrange for the presence of a support person who is not a witness. If
the only adult who can support the child is also a witness, the adult may testify before
the child so that the adult can remain in the courtroom during the child's testimony.
7. Closing the Courtroom to the Public and the Press
One obvious way to reduce the stress of testifying is to close the courtroom to
the public and the press. Under the U.S. Constitution, however, the defendant in a
criminal case has a right to a public trial.176 The right is not absolute, however, and
competing interests may be balanced against the defendant's right to an open
proceeding.'77 Closure is particularly appropriate when a child must describe
degrading and embarrassing acts.178 Nevertheless, in the United States, open trials are
the norm, and closure the exception.
In addition to the defendant's right to a public trial, the American public and
press have a constitutional right to attend criminal trials. 79 Here too the right is not
absolute, and, in selected cases, the public and press may be excluded.'80 The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court'8' is the
leading American authority on closing the courtroom when children testify. In Globe
174. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 338, at 556 (2d ed. 1994).
175. See Government of V.I. v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1980).
176. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... public trial." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VI; see, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
177. See United States v. Short. 36 M.J. 802 (A.C.M.R. 1993); People v. Holveck, 565 N.E.2d 919 (II1.
1990); State v. Guajardo, 605 A.2d 217 (N.H. 1992).
178. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
179. See id.; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
180. See United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 88 (1st Cir. 1995) ("This First Amendment right of
access is not absolute, however. Competing values and interests may wan-ant a denial of access to proceedings and
records in some situations .... "), cert. denied sub norn. Globe Newspaper Co. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1564
(1996).
181. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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Newspaper, the Court declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts law that required
judges to exclude the press and public in all cases where young sex offense victims
testify. The Supreme Court wrote:
Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it
is not absolute. ... But the circumstances under which the press and public
can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in
denying access must be a weighty one. Where, as in the present case, the
State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.1
In Globe Newspaper, the State argued that its interest in protecting young sex
offense victims from further trauma justified across-the-board exclusion of the press
and public during children's testimony. The Supreme Court stated that "safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" ' is a compelling govern-
mental interest that sometimes overrides the public and press right of access, but the
Court went on to rule that closure in all cases is unconstitutional. The Court wrote
that, despite the compelling nature of the state's interest, the need to protect sex
offense victims
does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circum-
stances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A
trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is
necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim. Among the factors to be
weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and under-
standing, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests
of parents and relatives.' 4
In every case the party seeking to close the courtroom-usually the prosecutor-
must convince the judge that closure is necessary to protect "an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced.' ' 5
A number of American states have laws regarding closure of the courtroom,1
86
and the U.S. Congress enacted a provision that applies in federal courts:
182. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07.
183. Id. at 607.
184. Id. at 608-09.
185. Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,48 (1984).
186. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1935); N,H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:8 (1996).
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When a child testifies the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom
of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct
interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on
the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause
substantial psychological harm to the child or would result in the child's
inability to effectively communicate. Such an order shall be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's specific compelling interest.1t 7
8. Video Testimony
No reform has generated more legislation and debate in the United States and
elsewhere than allowing children to give evidence outside the physical presence of
the defendant.' Although several methods are available to accomplish this goal, the
technique that garners the most attention is closed circuit television or, as it is called
in Scotland and England, live television link.89 Unfortunately, the goal of sparing
children the ordeal of a face-to-face encounter with the accused collides head-on with
the defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses. John Spencer and Rhona Flin
capture the importance in the adversary system of face-to-face confrontation when
they write that "[i]t is a widely held belief among lawyers in the English-speaking
world that confronting the accuser with the person he accuses ensures he tells the
truth."' 9 The United States Supreme Court wrote:
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over
the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness "may feel quite
differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand
what sort of human being that man is .... It is always more difficult to tell
a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind his back." In the former
context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly....
[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or
abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.'9'
Thus, face-to-face confrontation between witness and defendant is a cornerstone
of adversarial criminal trials. 92 In the United States, confrontation takes on
187. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(e) (West Supp. 1996).
188. See, e.g., Jean Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child Witnesses, I PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y &L. 340 (1995); Two Legislative Innovations, supra note 68.
189. See VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55; MURRAY, supra note 68.
190. SPENCER & FLiN, supra note 8, at 277.
191. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (citations ommitted).
192. See IRISH LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 152, at 146 ("Confrontation and cross-examination
are indelible characteristics of the adversarial system as normally operated .... ).
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heightened significance because the right is expressly enshrined in the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "[in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be confronted with the witnesses
against him."'93 In England, "by contrast, there is no question of rules of procedure
and evidence being held unconstitutional, because there is no written constitution."194
Ireland has a written constitution, although the document does not, by its terms,
guarantee face-to-face confrontation, and the Irish Law Reform Commission con-
cluded that "[t]here is... no authority for the proposition that a constitutional right
of physical confrontation" exists in Ireland 95
In the early and mid-1980s, numerous states in the United States passed video
testimony laws designed to spare selected children face-to-face confrontation. 9'Like
the governor on an engine, however, the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution regulates how quickly and how far these laws may travel on the road to
reform. In countries that do not have a constitutional guarantee of face-to-face
confrontation, reform has been more thoroughgoing than in the United States.
Video testimony laws are of three types: (1) Videotaped investigative interviews,
(2) videotaped testimony taken prior to trial, and (3) trial testimony through live link
television.
a. Videotaped Investigative Interviews
England leads the way regarding use at trial of videotaped investigative
interviews.'97 The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 "permits, for the first time, the
admission of videotaped interviews with a child, conducted by a police officer or
social worker as a substitute for the child's evidence-in-chief at trial."' 98 The judge
has authority to exclude the tape "in the interests of justice," and the child must
appear at trial for cross-examination.'"
Canadian law "contains a provision for the admissibility of videotaped interviews
of child complainants of sexual abuse as long as the child adopts the contents of the
tape on the witness stand, and the tape has been made within a reasonable length of
time after the offense." In Regina v. D.O.L,2°' the Supreme Court of Canada ruled
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
194. SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8, at 78.
195. IRISH LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 152, at 139.
196. For compilations of statutes, see IV NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 41, at Child Witnesses tab. 20. Admissibility of Videotaped Depostions or Testimony:
id. at Child Witnesses tab. 21, Admissibility of Videotaped Interviews or Statements.
197. See Ray Bull & Graham Davies, The Effect of Child Witness Research on Legislation in Great Britain,
in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 96; see also
SPENCER & FLIN, supra note 8. at 165-207.
198. VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55, at I.
199. 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OFENGLAND AND WALES 253 (1993) (Criminal Justice Act,§ 32A (1988)).
200. Sas et aL., Children and the Courts in Canada, supra note 106.
201. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419.
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that admitting videotaped interviews "neither offends the principles of fundamental
justice nor violates the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by ... the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms." 20
During the 1980s, a number of American states enacted laws authorizing video-
taped investigative interviews to be used at trial, usually in lieu of the child's trial
testimony.2 3 Several of these laws compromised the defendant's constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine child witnesses, and the statutes received mixed
reviews from the courts?3 4
b. Videotaped Testimony Taken Prior to Trial
A substantial number of American states and the federal government have laws
allowing pretrial videotaping of children's testimony. °5 The taping occurs in the
courtroom or at some other location. The laws usually require that the defendant be
present at the videotaping. A number of statutes allow the judge to exclude the
defendant from the videotaping if face-to-face confrontation would traumatize the
child.2°
202. Regina, 4 S.C.R. at 421.
203. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (West 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626 (Michie 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3433 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(2) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440.5 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
595.02.3 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.304 (West Supp. 1996); TEX. CRM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (West
Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.08 (West 1993); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5(1).
204. See Lucy S. McGough, For the Record: Videotaping Investigative hterviews, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y
&L. 370 (1995). The author wrote:
The appellate courts of six states (Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin)
have upheld the constitutionality of their state videotaped evidence statutes when faced with
confrontation or due process challenges.
[Author's footnote: State v. Johnson, 729 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1986); State in the Interest of
R.C. Jr., 514 So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Larson, 447 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
976 (1992); Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Tarantino,
458 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). Florida has so far declined to decide the issue. See
Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).]
In contrast, the appellate courts of Illinois, Tennessee, and Oklahoma have ruled their states' pretrial
videotaped child witness's statement statutes unconstitutional.
[Author's footnote: People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670 (111. 1989); State v. Pilkey, 776
S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 (1990); Burke v. State, 820 P.2d 1344
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991)].
Id. at 381-82.
205. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41 (Banks-Baldwin 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5984(a) (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
13.1 (1994) (limited to grand jury proceedings); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA R.
CRIM. P. 12; UTAH R. CRim. P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 807(d).
206. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1996); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 12.2.b.
205
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c. Trial Testimony Through Live Television Link
In the United States, perhaps the most controversial courtroom reform is the live
television link, which allows selected children to testify outside the physical presence
of the defendant via closed-circuit television.20 The live television link often entails
a complete abrogation of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation, and it
is on constitutional grounds that the American battle over live link has raged.
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the constitutional issue with its
decision in Maryland v. Craig.2°' The Court reiterated the importance of confron-
tation but concluded that a face-to-face encounter at trial is not required in every
case. The Court wrote that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-
being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in
some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." 9 Before
confrontation may be curtailed, however, ajudge must determine that the defendant's
presence will cause emotional distress that "is more than de minimis, i.e., more than
'mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify."' 2t0 Moreover, the
child's distress must emanate from the defendant, not from fear of the courtroom,
spectators, or other factors. Although the Court declined to say how much emotional
distress is required, the Court stated that "'serious emotional distress such that the
child cannot reasonably communicate,' clearly suffices to meet constitutional stan-
dards." 21
The Supreme Court made clear that states may not enact laws that authorize all
or most children to testify via live television link. Before a defendant's confrontation
right may be impaired, the judge must determine that the particular child would be
traumatized by a face-to-face encounter.
Countries that do not have a constitutional confrontation right do not ignore the
importance of confrontation.212 Nevertheless, such countries have greater flexibility
to employ video testimony. Thus, although the video testimony train left the station
in the United States, it picked up steam elsewhere. Canada, England, and New
Zealand climbed aboard in 1988 and 1989.213 In Scotland, "[s]tatutory authority for
the use of live television link by child witnesses" went into effect in 1990.214 By the
207. The legal literature on the subject is voluminous. See, e.g., Montoya, supra note 188, at 340.
208. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
209. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
210. Id. at 856.
211. Id.
212. See SPENCER & FLtN. supra note 8, at 393.
213. See GRAHAM DAVIES & ELIZABETH NOON, AN EVALUATION OFTHE LIVE LINK FOR CHILD WITNESSES
(1991); VIDEOTAPING CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE. supra note 55; Bull & Davies, supra notel97; Margaret-Ellen Pipe
& Mark Henaghan, Accommodating Children's Testimony: Legal Refonns in New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 145;Sas et al.. Children and the
Courts in Canada, supra note 106.
214. MURRAY, supra note 68, at i; see Flin et al., supra note 85.
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early 1990s, most Australian jurisdictions enacted "[1]egislation allowing the use of
closed circuit television for child witnesses."2 5
Many advocates of testimony via live television link believe the procedure
lowers children's distress and improves the quality of their evidence. Research pro-
vides support for the former216 but offers a mixed appraisal of the latter. Experi-
mental research by Ann Tobey and her colleagues provides insight into the effects
of the use of a live television link on children and mock jurors.2 17 The research
involved mock trials with six- and eight-year-old witnesses. The children ex-
perienced a benign event and later testified about the event in a mock trial that the
children thought was an actual trial. Some children testified in the courtroom while
others testified via live television link, allowing comparisons between the two
groups. Children were examined with three types of questions: specific, misleading,
and correctly leading. Tobey wrote:
the younger children made significantly more errors of omission in the
regular trial condition than in the closed-circuit condition. However, for
children testifying in the closed-circuit setting, younger children did not
make significantly more omission errors than older children. Thus, com-
pared with testifying via closed-circuit television, testifying in open court
appeared to be problematic for the younger children because it was
associated with an increase in omission errors to misleading questions.
Similarly, when the proportion of commission errors to the misleading
questions was considered, adverse effects of testifying in open court were
again detected.
When testifying in regular trials (that is, in open court), younger children
made significantly more commission and omission errors than older
children. Younger children testifying in regular trials also made more errors
of omission than their peers who testified in a closed-circuit television
setting.... [Y]oung children who testified in open court were found to have
more errors with misleading questions than older children and other children
their age who testified from the more protective environment of the closed-
circuit courtroom.
215. Shrimpton et al., supra note 106.
216. See supra note 213 (citing authorities). Use of live television link does not relieve children's stress
entirely. See MURRAY, supra note 68, at 66.
217. See Ann E. Tobey, Gail S. Goodman, Jennifer M. Batterman-Faunce, Holly K. Orcutt & Toby
Sachsenmaier, Balancing the Rights of Children and Defendants: Effects of Closed-Circuit Television on Children's
Accuracy and Jurors' Perceptions, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS, supra note 60, at 214.
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In addition to examining the childien's accuracy, we were also interested in
the mock jurors' reactions to child witnesses who testified via closed-circuit
television versus in open court. Would children be viewed as more or less
credible witnesses when seen on a TV screen? In general, closed-circuit
television was associated with more negative ratings of the child witnesses.
Specifically, jurors rated children who testified via closed-circuit television
as less believable, less accurate for both the prosecution and the defense
attorney, less accurate in recalling the event, more likely to have made up the
story, less able to testify based on fact rather than fantasy, less attractive, less
intelligent, and less confident.2 18
... The present study may have important implications for the use of closed-
circuit technology when children testify. The protective atmosphere
provided by the closed-circuit modality seemed most beneficial for young
children, who were found to be less suggestible and who were rated as less
stressed when not in the courtroom. However, the effects of testifying via
closed-circuit television were not completely positive in regard to children's
accuracy (e.g., for young children, the closed-circuit condition was also
associated with more commission errors overall when the defendant was
guilty). Despite this mixed pattern, the closed-circuit technology created
consistent biases in the minds of the mock jurors against the child witnesses,
indicating that a live witness will create a stronger case for the
prosecution.21
9
Kathleen Murray's evaluation of live television link testimony in actual criminal
trials in Scotland provides further insight into the mixed results of this technological
innovation. Murray wrote:
Impact on the child
Children who testified by means of a live television link were significantly
less likely to be in tears during cross-examination than children in the court
room.
Children who testified by means of a live television link were significantly
less likely to report feeling fear while testifying than those in the court room.
218. Id. at 231-32.
219. Id. at 237-38.
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Children who testified by means of a live television link were significantly
more likely than children in the court room to report that the mode of
presenting their evidence was fair.
Impact on quality of child's evidence
Children who testified by means of a live television link gave less detail
during examination-in-chief than children in the court room.
Children who testified by means of a live television link were less resistant
to leading questions on peripheral matters during cross-examination than
children in the court room....
Relationship between signs of stress in the child and quality of evidence
Children who were rated as under stress were significantly more likely to
recant the assault and give inconsistent information than children who were
not so rated.
Impact of live television link on relationship between child's stress and
quality of the child's evidence
Children who were rated as under stress during examination-in-chief were
more likely to be consistent regarding the main actions of the accused when
testifying over live television link than in the court room.
Children who were rated as under stress during examination-in-chief were
more likely to be consistent regarding the timing of events when testifying
over a live television link than in the court room.
Impact of live television link on relationship between lawyers questioning
and quality of evidence
When prosecutors' questions focused primarily on the main actions of the
accused, children on television were more likely to answer than children in
the court room.
Impact of live television link on rate of conviction
220. See MURRAY, supra note 68, at 80 (stating that children who testified in the courtroom provided more
detail than children who testified by live television link).
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There was no significant difference between live television link cases and
non-link cases in rate of conviction. 2Y
Murray observed that in some respects testimony by live television link creates
"more problems for the prosecution than the defen[s]e. ' '222 She wrote that:
Whilst the differences in consistency levels between television users and
non-users are not statistically significant, there was a clear tendency to rate
the children testifying in the courtroom as more consistent than those on
television when referring to the main actions of the accused and when
answering questions about place.... [T]he users of a live television link
were more likely to change their story than those in open court, particularly
in examination-in-chief. During cross-examination, none of the children in
the courtroom recanted that the assault occurred.2 3
... [C]hildren's testimony presented in the court room was rated as more
effective and more credible than testimony over the live television link,
except under cross-examination when children's testimony was seen as less
credible in the court room ....224
* . . [O]nce children reached the trial the value of [live television link]
appeared less certain. The results reported here.., lend support to the belief
that the ability to recount detailed and consistent testimony depended in
some measure on freedom from anxiety and on an understanding and
supportive questioner. However, in our experience these ideal conditions
were more likely to prevail in the conventional court room than in the use of
technology. We observed that children who testified in the conventional way
were more relaxed, more communicative, less tearful. They answered more
of the prosecutors' questions, provided more detailed and consistent testi-
mony and were less likely to go back on their story. The prosecutors were
more comfortable with the children by their side or in the witness box, and
they felt under less pressure to ask non-leading questions. The cross-
examiners were less likely to challenge witnesses on the central facts and
children strongly resisted their leading questions on peripheral matters.
Furthermore, most importantly, when testifying in the court room, children
never recanted the assault in sexual abuse cases.2z
221. Id. at v.
222. Id. at 87.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 103.
225. IL at 108.
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Testimony by live television link is not a panacea. It is not surprising that many
prosecutors are less than enthusiastic about the technology.
9. Counsel, Guardian Ad Litem, or Advocate for the Child
One way to help children cope with the adversary legal system is to assign an
advocate to protect their interests.226 In the United States, the advocate's role varies
with the type of litigation. In noncriminal cases, a child's advocate often takes an
active role in investigating the case, making recommendations to the court, and
examining and cross-examining witnesses at trial. 7 In criminal trials, a child's
advocate plays a more limited role.m For example, in North Dakota criminal cases,
a child's advocate--called a guardian ad litem--"may not separately introduce
evidence or directly examine or cross-examine witnesses." 29 When not in trial,
however, a child's advocate may take an active part in assisting the child and family
through the labyrinth of the legal system. Florida has a useful statute that provides:
Appointment of advocate for victims or witnesses who are minors ....
(1) A guardian ad litem or other advocate shall be appointed by the court to
represent a minor in any criminal proceeding if the minor is a victim of or
witness to child abuse or neglect, or if the minor is a victim of a sexual
offense or a witness to a sexual offense committed against another minor.
The court may appoint a guardian ad litem or other advocate in any other
criminal proceeding in which a minor is involved as either a victim or a
witness. The guardian ad litem or other advocate shall have full access to all
evidence and reports introduced during the proceedings, may interview
witnesses, may make recommendations to the court, shall be noticed and
have the right to appear on behalf of the minor at all proceedings, and may
request additional examinations by medical doctors, psychiatrists, or
psychologists. It is the duty of the guardian ad litem or other advocate to
perform the following services:
(a) To explain, in language understandable to the minor, all legal procee-
dings in which the minor shall be involved;
(b) To act, as a friend of the court, to advise the judge, whenever appro-
priate, of the minor's ability to understand and cooperate with any court
226. See IV NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 41, at Child
Witnesses tab. 25, Authorization for Special Support Persons in Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings.
227. See ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY (1993).
228. See DEBRA WHrrcOMB, GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN CRIMINAL COURTS (1988).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-16 (1993).
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proceeding; and
(c) To assist the minor and the minor's family in coping with the emotional
effects of the crime and subsequent criminal proceedings in which the minor
is involved.230
Child victims are not parties to criminal litigation and, like other crime victims,
children sometimes get "lost in the shuffle." Children need a voice-an adult who
understands the legal system and who has authority to speak up for them. Research
indicates that judges seldom implement accommodations that are available under
existing law.23' One reason for infrequent accommodation is probably the child's
voicelessness in the process. An effective antidote to this unsatisfactory state of
affairs is to ensure that every child involved in the criminal justice system has an ad-
vocate to protect his or her interests. The Child Witness Code at the end of this Arti-
cle requires appointment of a guardian ad litem for every child involved in a criminal
case.
10. Corroboration of Children's Testimony
During much of the twentieth century, children's testimony in sex offense cases
was viewed with skepticism, and some courts imposed a corroboration requirement
when a child's testimony was less than clear and convincing, or when the child's
credibility was attacked.z2
During the 1970s and 1980s, courts moved away from the corroboration require-
ment and, today, most jurisdictions do not impose corroboration as a substantive
requirement. Thus, a conviction may be predicated on the uncorroborated testimony
of a child. 3
11. Jury Instruction Regarding Child Witnesses
It was once common to instruct jurors to consider a child's testimony with
care.2-4 The modem trend, however, is moving away from such precautionary in-
230. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.17 (West 1994).
231. See MURRAY, supra note 68, at i; Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 83 ("Despite laws in
Colorado that permit the use ofa variety of innovative techniques designed to decrease courtroom trauma to child
victims in sexual assault cases (e.g., videotaped testimony), use of these techniques was infrequent .... '). But see
Pipe & Henaghan, *supra note 213, at 161 (surveying professionals in New Zealand and finding that
accommodations for child witnesses are "frequently used and that they have become the norm rather than the
exception. As one judge commented, cases in which screens and other procedures were not recommended were
.now very much the exception'....").
232. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 13, § 5.17,
233. Id.
234. id. § 8.14.
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structions.235
12. Residual Category
The accommodations outlined above by no means cover the waterfront. Judges
make on-the-spot decisions to meet the exigencies of particular cases,, and legis-
latures refine existing laws and generate new ideas. Ireland
2 36 and South Africa.23 7
for example, have laws that allow the court to appoint an intermediary to question
child witnesses. The Child Witness Code that follows incorporates many ideas found
in the law of individual states and countries.
235. See, e.g., Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1994).
236. See Ireland Criminal Evidence Act, § 14 (1992). The statute states:
(1) Where-
(a) a person is accused of an offense to which this Part applies, and
(b) a person under 17 years of age is giving, or is to give, evidence through a live television link,
the court may, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, if satisfied that, having regard to the
age or mental condition of the witness, the interests of justice require that any questions to be put to the
witness be put through an intermediary, direct that any such questions be so put.
(2) Questions put to a witness through an intermediary under this section shall be either in the words
used by the questioner or so as to convey to the witness in a way which is appropriate to his age
and mental condition the meaning of the questions being asked.
(3) An intermediary referred to in subjection (1) shall be appointed by the court and shall be a person
who, in its opinion, is competent to act as such.
237. See § 51 of South Africa Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, as amended in 1991, which states:
(I) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to such court that it
would expose any witness under the age of 18 years to undue mental stress or suffering if he
testifies at such proceedings, the court may, subject to subsection (4) appoint a competent person
as an intermediary in order to enable such witness to give his evidence through that intermediary..
(2) (a) No examination, cross-examination or re-examination of any witness in respect of whom a
court has appointed an intermediary under subjection (1), except examination by the court,
shall take place in any manner other than through that intermediary.
(b) The said intermediary may, unless the court directs otherwise, convey the general purport
of any question to the relevant witness.
(3) If a court appoints an intermediary under subsection (1), the court may direct that the relevant
witness shall give his evidence at any place-
(a) which is informally arranged to set that witness at ease;
(b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset that witness, is outside the
sight and hearing of that witness; and
(c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is necessary at the relevant
proceedings to see and hear, either directly or through the medium of any electronic or other
devices, that intermediary as well as that witness during his testimony.
(4) (a) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette determine the persons or the category or class of
persons who are competent to be appointed as intermediaries.
(b) An intermediary who is not in the full-time employment of the State shall be paid such
traveling and subsistence and other allowances in respect of the services rendered by him
as the Minister, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, may determine.
I., quoted in Dap Louw & Pierre Olivier, Listening to Children in South Africa, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CHILD ABUSE AND CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note *, at 168, 179-80.
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CONCLUSION
The past decade witnessed unprecedented change to accommodate children in
court. Change has come in fits and starts, and is far from uniform. Moreover, some
accommodations trammeled the rights of defendants. Nevertheless, the tide of change
appears irreversible and, in the end, beneficial to children and the search for truth.
The proposed code at the end of this Article endeavors to synthesize ten years of
reform into a comprehensive Child Witness Code.
CHILD WITNESS CODE
The Child Witness Code that follows pertains to criminal cases. The Code draws
heavily on existing law in the United States. Several sections of the Code-
particularly sections dealing with live link television-are perhaps unique to the
United States, with its constitutional guarantee of face-to-face confrontation. It is my
hope that policy makers in the United States and other countries will find portions
of the Code worthy of consideration.
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Child Witness Code
§ 1 Legislative Intent
The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:
(a) This state has a compelling interest in protecting children from abuse. The
law plays an important role in protecting children and punishing the persons
who abuse them.
(b) Testimony from children is often essential to prove that abuse occurred, to
identify the perpetrator of abuse, and to prove other crimes. Thus, children
often must testify in legal proceedings.
(c) The courtrooms of this state and other states are not designed with children
in mind, and the formal nature of the courtroom and the proceedings that
occur there cause fear and anxiety that interferes with some children's ability
to provide full and accurate testimony. In addition to fear and anxiety that
interferes with full and accurate testimony, testifying in the traditional
fashion is emotionally harmful for some children. Because testifying is very
stressful for many children, and because testifying traumatizes some children
and can interfere with full and accurate testimony, this state has a
compelling interest in accommodating child witnesses to reduce unnecessary
stress, anxiety, fear, and trauma, and to increase the accuracy and
completeness of their testimony.
(d) Accommodations for child witnesses can be made without compromising the
right to a fair trial and without unnecessarily undermining the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses.
(e) The judges of this state have a responsibility to protect vulnerable witnesses,
including children, from unnecessary stress and trauma. Judges can
accommodate child witnesses without compromising judicial neutrality and
without undermining the rights of persons accused of a crime. Research
discloses that judges seldom implement accommodations that are available
to them under existing law.28 It is the intent of the Legislature that the
judges of this state make liberal use of the provisions set forth in this Code
to ensure maximum accommodation for child witnesses and to protect
children from unnecessary trauma and stress. Judges should take an active
role in accommodating child witnesses to reduce traumaand increase the
238. See MURRAY, supra note 68. at I; Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 83, 85.
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accuracy and completeness of their testimony.
(f) The cooperation of children and their families is essential to the successful
prosecution of child abuse and other crimes. Release of information
identifying child victims and witnesses and their families may subject the
child and the child's family to unwanted contacts by the media, public
scrutiny, severe embarrassment and humiliation, and psychological harm,
and may place the child and the child's family at risk from some
perpetrators. Release of information regarding a child victim or witness or
the child's family to the press and the public harms the child and the child's
family and has a chilling effect on the willingness of children and their
families to report child abuse and other crimes and to cooperate with the
investigation and prosecution of crime. Public dissemination of the child's
name, address, phone number, school, and other identifying information
about the child and the child's family is not necessary for the accurate
release of information to the public concerning the operation of the criminal
justice system. Therefore, the Legislature intends to assure child victims and
witnesses and their families that the identities and locations of child victims
and witnesses and their families will remain confidential.
§ 2 Title of Code
This code shall be known as the Child Witness Code.
§ 3 Purposes
The purposes of this Code are to ascertain the truth, reduce trauma to children,
create conditions that will allow children to provide reliable and complete
evidence, increase the number of children who are able to testify in legal
proceedings, and protect the rights of persons accused of crime.
§ 4 Applicability of Child Witness Code
(a) This Code applies in all criminal proceedings, including pretrial and post-
trial proceedings, conducted in this state. The term "criminal proceeding"
includes juvenile delinquency proceedings conducted in the juvenile court.
(b) This Code applies to children who are victims of crime and children who
witness crime but are not victims thereof. Certain sections of this Code apply
only to children who are victims of crime.
(c) To the extent provisions of this Code provide guidance in civil litigation, a
judge may rely on provisions of this Code to accommodate children in civil
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§ 5 Code to Be Liberally Construed to Accommodate Children
This Code shall be liberally construed to ensure maximum accommodation of
child witnesses. The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof
are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code.
§ 6 Inherent Judicial Authority
Judges of this state have inherent judicial authority to accommodate children in
addition to the specific accommodations authorized by this Code.
§ 7 Definitions
(a) "Child" means a person under the age of 18 years.
(b) "Child abuse" means physical abuse, sexual abuse, and criminal neglect as
defined elsewhere in applicable law.
(c) "Intermediary" means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to
a child witness.
(d) "Record regarding a child" or "record" means any photograph, videotape,
audiotape, film, handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic recording,
computer data or printout, or other memorialization, including any court
document, indictment, complaint, or information, or any copy or
reproduction of any of the foregoing, that contains the name, description,
address, school, or any other personal identifying information about a child
or the child's family and that is produced by or maintained by a public
agency, private agency, or individual.
§ 8 Vertical Prosecution
Whenever practicable, the same prosecutor should handle all aspects of a case
involving a child victim.
§ 9 Special Precautions for Child Witnesses
The court shall take steps to provide for the comfort and support of child
witnesses and to protect children from coercion, intimidation, unnecessary
psychological stress, and undue influence.
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§ 10 Docket Priority
The court shall give docket priority to any criminal case involving a child victim.
The court and the prosecutor shall take appropriate steps to insure a speedy trial
in order to minimize the length of time the child must endure the stress of
involvement in the proceedings.
§ 11 Continuances" 9
Whenever a motion or other request for a delay or continuance is made in a case
involving a child victim, the court shall grant the delay or continuance only for
substantial reasons, and the court shall consider and give weight to the adverse
impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the child. The
court shall make findings on the record when granting a continuance in cases
involving a child victim.
§ 12 Court Preparation Programs
Programs designed to prepare children to testify serve the interests of justice and
are encouraged. Judges are encouraged to participate in court preparation
programs, and judicial participation in such programs is not a ground for recusal
or disqualification. Judges should make their courtroom and staff available for
court preparation programs. The fact that a child participated in a court
participation program may not be used to impeach the child's credibility.
§ 13 Waiting Area for Child Witnesses
(a) The court shall provide a waiting area for children that is separate from
waiting areas used by other persons. The child's waiting area should be
furnished so as to make the child comfortable.
239. There is general agreement that excessive continuances can harm children by prolonging their
involvement in the legal system. See Desmond K. Runyan, The Emotional Impact of Societal hitervention into
ChildAbuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 263, 270 (Gall
S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993) ("[C]hildren left in limbo by the criminal court system were only 8
percent as likely to evidence improvement in depression as were their peers who were not in the court system or
who had resolved all court issues."). It is interesting to note, however, that Gail Goodman and her colleagues found:
Contrary to our prediction, the more times the case was continued, the more likely the child's behavioral
adjustment was to improve. This is surprising because it is commonly believed that continuances
increase children's distress. Our finding appears to reflect the mere passage of time, however. Since
continuances typically prolonged the case, continuances gave the children more time to recover. When
the length of the legal process was controlled, the number of continuances experienced no longer
predicted improvement.
Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 118.
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(b) Courts are encouraged to create special waiting areas for child witnesses.
§ 14 Guardian Ad Litem
(a) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who was a victim of,
or a witness to, a crime to protect the best interests of the child. In making
the appointment, the court shall consider a prospective guardian's
background in and familiarity with the judicial process, social service
programs, and child development. The guardian ad litem shall not be a
person who is a witness in a proceeding involving the child for whom the
guardian is appointed. The guardian ad litem may, but need not, be an
attorney. The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings.
(b) Duties of Guardian Ad Litem.
A guardian ad litem:
(1) May attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings
in which the child participates.
(2) Shall remain with the child in the courthouse or other location while the
child waits to testify.
(3) May make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the
child.
(4) May have access to all reports, evaluations, and records, except
attorney's work product, necessary to advocate effectively for the child.
(5) May interview witnesses.
(6) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special
services to the child.
(7) May request additional examinations by medical or mental health
professionals if there is a compelling need for additional examination.
(8) Shall explain, in language understandable to their ward, all legal procee-
dings, including police investigations, in which the child is involved.
(9) Shall, to the extent appropriate, assist the child and the child's family in
coping with the emotional effects of crime and subsequent criminal or
civil proceedings in which the child is involved.
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(c) A guardian ad litem shall not be compelled to testify in any proceeding
concerning any information, statement, or opinion received from, or
provided for, the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem.
(d) A guardian ad litem shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and shall
be immune from civil and criminal liability for complying with the
guardian's duties described in this section.
(e) A guardian ad litem shall not participate in the trial by way of juror voir dire,
opening statement, closing argument, introducing or objecting to evidence,
or examination of witnesses, including the child witness; Provided, however,
that a guardian ad litem may:
(1) If the guardian ad litem is an attorney the guardian ad litem may object
during trial under section 33 that questions asked of the child are
developmentally inappropriate.
(2) A guardian ad litem, whether or not an attorney, may communicate
concerns regarding the child to the court at any time when court is not
in session.
(3) A guardian ad litem, whether or not an attorney, may communicate
concerns regarding the childd to the court when court is in session
through an officer of the court designated for that purpose by the court.
(4) A guardian ad litem, whether or not an attorney, may file motions
pursuant to sections 20, 36, 37, 39, and 41(e).
§ 15 Support Persons
(a) A child testifying at or attending a judicial proceeding or deposition shall
have the right to be accompanied by up to two persons of the child's own
choosing, one of whom may be a witness, to provide emotional support to
the child. Both support persons may remain in the courtroom or other room
and in the child's sight during the child's testimony. One of the support
persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support
person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the defendant
or the trier of fact. If needed for emotional support, the support person may
hold the child's hand, hold the child on the support person's lap throughout
the course of the proceeding, or take other steps appropriate to support the
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(b) If a person chosen under subdivision (a) is also a witness, the court may
disapprove the choice if the defense establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the support person's attendance during the testimony of the
child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of
the child's testimony.
(c) If a person chosen under subdivision (a) is also a witness, the testimony of
the support person shall normally be presented before the testimony of the
child.
(d) A support person shall not provide the child with an answer to any question
directed to the child during the course of the child's testimony or otherwise
prompt the child. The court shall admonish the support person or persons not
to prompt, sway, or influence the child during the child's testimony.
§ 16 Competency
Every child, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness unless the child lacks
the ability to communicate, remember, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court. Every child is presumed to possess
the requirements contained in this section.
§ 17 Competency Examination
(a) When Competency Examination Allowed. A court shall not hold a
competency examination for a child unless the court, on its own motion or
the motion of a party, determines that substantial doubt exists regarding the
child's competence to testify. A party seeking a competency examination
must present specific evidence that establishes that a competency
examination is required. A child's age alone is not a sufficient reason for a
competency examination.
(b) Burden on Party Challenging Competence. If a court orders a competency
examination, the burden of persuasion is on the party challenging the child's
competence to rebut the presumption of competence established by section
16 and to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the child is not
competent.
240. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5 (West Supp. 1996).
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(c) Persons Present at Examination. The persons who may be present at a
competency examination are limited to:
(1) the judge;
(2) the attorneys for the parties;
(3) the child's guardian ad litem;
(4) one or more support persons for the child;
(5) the defendant unless the defendant is excluded from the competency
examination pursuant to section (d); and
(6) such other persons as the Court deems appropriate.
(d) Excluding Defendant from Examination. The defendant shall be excluded
from the competency examination unless the court determines that
competence cannot be fully evaluated in the absence of the defendant.
(e) Examination Outside Jury's Presence. A competency examination shall
be conducted out of the sight and hearing of the jury unless the court
determines that the examination should occur in the presence of the jury. A
competency examination may be conducted in the judge's chambers or in
some other location.
(f) Questioning by the Court. Examination of a child related to competence
shall normally be conducted by the court. Attorneys may submit questions
to the court which the court may, in its discretion, ask the child. The court
may permit an attorney to examine a child directly on competence if the
court is satisfied that the child will not suffer emotional trauma as a result of
the examination.
(g) Developmentally Appropriate Questions. The questions asked at the
competency examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental
level of the child, shall not be related to the issues at trial, and shall focus on
the child's ability to communicate, remember, understand the difference
between truth and falsehood, and understand the duty to testify truthfully.
(h) Psychological and Psychiatric Examination Regarding Competence
Prohibited. Psychological and psychiatric examination to assess the
competence of a child witness shall not be ordered.
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(i) Continuing Duty to Assess Competence. The court's responsibility to
assess competence continues throughout the child's testimony.
§ 18 Oath or Affirmation
Before testifying, a child shall be required to declare that the child will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation in a form calculated to awaken the child's
conscience and impress the child's mind with the duty to do so. For a child under
the age of 10 the court shall administer an affirmation in which the child
promises to tell the truth.
§ 19 Interpreter for Child
(a) When a child is incapable of understanding the English language or is
incapable, due to developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other
reason, of communicating in the English language so as to be heard and
understood directly by counsel, court, and jury, an interpreter whom the
child can understand and who understands the child shall be sworn to
interpret for the child.
(b) An interpreter should not be a witness in the case and should not have an
interest in the case: Provided, however, that if a witness or member of the
child's family is the only person who can serve as an interpreter for the
child, then the witness or family member may serve as the child's
interpreter. If the interpreter is also a witness, the interpreter shall normally
testify before the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate
interpretation.
§ 20 Intermediary to Pose Questions to Child
(a) A party or the child's guardian ad litem may apply for an order that an
intermediary be appointed by the court. The court may appoint an
intermediary on its own motion.
(b) The court may appoint an intermediary to pose questions to a child if the
court finds that the child is unable to understand and/or respond to questions
asked by counsel or the court.
(c) If the court appoints an intermediary to pose questions to the child, counsel
for the parties shall not question the child. The intermediary shall pose
questions desired by the prosecution and defense.
225
1996/Steps Toward A Child Witness Code
(d) Questions put to a child through an intermediary shall be either in the words
selected by counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the words
selected by counsel, in words which are comprehensible to the child and
which convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(e) An intermediary shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the
child accurately according to the meaning intended by counsel.
§ 21 Psychological and Psychiatric Examinations Regarding Credibility
Prohibited
Psychological and psychiatric examination to assess the credibility of a child
witness shall not be ordered.
§ 22 Comfort Items
A child shall be allowed to have with him or her while testifying a comfort item
of the child's own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.
§ 23 Testimonial Aids
The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomical dolls, puppets, drawings,
mannequins, or any other demonstrative device the court deems appropriate for
the purpose of assisting a child in testifying.24'
§ 24 Recesses During Child's Testimony
(a) The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief from direct
examination, cross-examination, and re-examination during which the child
may retire from the courtroom. The court may allow other witnesses to
testify while the child retires from the courtroom.
(b) In advance of the child's testimony the court may order that relief from
testimony will occur at regular intervals.
(c) Child witnesses age eight and younger should normally be given relief from
testimony every twenty minutes or more frequently.
241. Caution is necessary to ensure that a child witness is not distracted by a testimonial aid. See Testifying
in Criminal Court, supra note 3, at 92 ("aking a toy to the stand and using props were both associated with the
child recanting previous testimony about peripheral details; perhaps the toys were somewhat distracting for children
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§ 25 Persons Prohibited from Entering and Leaving Courtroom
The court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the
courtroom during the child's testimony.
§ 26 Testimony During Appropriate Hours
The court may order that the child's testimony be taken during a time of day
when the child is well rested.
§ 27 Rearranging the Courtroom
In the court's discretion, the judge, child, parties, witnesses, support persons, and
court personnel may be relocated within the courtroom to facilitate a more
comfortable environment for the child. The child may testify from a location in
the courtroom other than the witness chair. The court shall supervise the spatial
arrangements of the courtroom and the location, movement, and deportment of
all persons in attendance. The witness chair or other place from which the child
testifies may be turned to facilitate the child's testimony. The defendant and the
trier of fact must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the child's
testimony. Whenever the witness chair or other place from which the child
testifies is turned pursuant to this section, the child must be able to see the
defendant without having to turn the child's head more than ninety degrees if the
child chooses to look at the defendant. Nothing in this section or any other
provision of law, except official in-court identification provisions, shall be
construed to require a child to look at the defendant. The judge may remove the
judge's robe. Accommodations for the child under this section need not be
supported by a finding of trauma to the child.
§ 28 Approaching the Witness
The court may prohibit an attorney from approaching a child if it appears that the
child is fearful of the attorney or intimidated by the attorney.
§ 29 Mode and Order of Questioning
The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1)
make the questioning and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) insure that questions are stated in
a form that is appropriate to the age and understanding of the child.
§ 30 Questioning by Court
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The court may question the child to clarify facts, ensure that the child
understands questions asked by attorneys, and for other purposes.
§ 31 Lending Questions During Direct Examination
The court may allow leading questions during direct and re-direct examination
of a child if leading questions will further the interests of justice.
§ 32 Objections
The court may order that objections be made so as not to frighten, confuse, or
intimidate the child.
§ 33 Objection to Developmentally Inappropriate Question
On its own motion, the objection of a party, or the objection of the child's
guardian ad litem the court shall forbid the asking of a question which is in a
form that is not reasonably likely to be understood by a child of the age or
developmental level of the child.
§ 34 Sexual Abuse Shield Statute
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any criminal or civil proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the source
of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged
victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct
offered by the accused to prove consent if consent is relevant or by
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the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only
if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and the child's guardian ad litem.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this section the court must conduct a
hearing in camera and afford the child, the child's nonoffending
parent(s), the child's guardian ad litem, and parties a right to attend and
be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must
be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order set
forth in section 41(d). The child shall not be required to testify at the
hearing in camera unless the child wishes to do so.
§ 35 Closing the Courtroom
When a child testifies the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of
all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in
the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record that
requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to the
child or would result in the child's inability to communicate effectively due to
embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In reaching its decision the court shall consider
the child's age, psychological maturity, the nature of the crime, the nature of the
child's testimony regarding the crime, the relationship of the child to the
defendant and to persons attending the trial, the desires of the child, and the
interests of the child's parents or guardians. Such an order shall be narrowly
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tailored to serve the state's interests in protecting the child from psychological
harm and ensuring complete testimony.
§ 36 Live Link Television Testimony
(a) The prosecutor or the child's guardian ad litem may apply for an order that
the child's testimony be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be
televised to the courtroom by live link television. Before the child's guardian
ad litem applies for an order under this section the guardian ad litem shall
consult with the prosecutor and shall defer to the prosecutor's judgment
regarding whether to apply for an order unless the guardian ad litem is
convinced that the prosecutor's decision not to apply for an order will cause
the child serious emotional trauma. The person seeking such an order shall
apply at least 5 days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record
that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live link
television as provided in subdivision (a) if the court finds any of the
following:
(1) The child is unable to testify fully in open court in the presence of the
defendant due to fear of the defendant.
(2) There is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer at least
moderate nontransient emotional trauma from testifying in the presence
of the defendant. The trauma need not be permanent, but must be more
than the nervousness and anxiety experienced by most witnesses.
(3) Conduct by defendant or defense counsel causes the child to be unable
to testify or continue testifying in the presence of defendant or defense
counsel.
(c) The court shall support a ruling on use of live link television on the record.
The court shall consider the totality of the circumstances. Expert testimony
may be considered, although expert testimony is not required to support a
ruling allowing live link television. The court may consider the following
factors:
(1) the child's age and level of development;
(2) the child's physical and mental health, including any mental or
physical disability;
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(3) any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by the
child;
(4) the nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) any threats against the child;
(6) the child's relationship to the defendant;
(7) the child's reaction to any prior encounters with the defendant in
court or elsewhere;
(8) the child's reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was
discussed with the child by parents or professionals;
(9) specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior
to testifying;
(10) testimony of lay witnesses;
(11) the child's custodial situation and the attitude of members of the
child's family regarding the events about which the child will
testify; and
(12) any other relevant factors.
(d) In ruling on a request for live link television the court may question the child
in chambers, or at some other comfortable place other than the courtroom,
on the record. The only other persons who may be present during the
questioning include a support person for the child, the prosecutor, the child's
guardian ad litem, and defense counsel. The defendant shall not attend the
questioning. Questioning shall not be related to the issues at trial except that
questions may relate to the child's feelings about testifying in the courtroom
in the presence of the defendant.
(e) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live link television, the
prosecutor and the attorney for the defendant, not including a defendant
representing him or herself, shall be present in a room outside the courtroom
with the child and the child shall be available for direct and
cross-examination. The only other persons who may be permitted in the
room with the child during the child's testimony are:
(1) the child's guardian ad litem;
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(2) persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment;
(3) a court officer, appointed by the court;
(4) other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary
to the welfare and well-being of the child; and
(5) one or both of the child's support persons.
(f) The child's testimony shall be transmitted by live link television into the
courtroom for viewing and hearing by the defendant, jury, judge, and public.
The defendant shall be provided with a means of private, contemporaneous
communication with the defendant's attorney during the testimony.
(g) While the child testifies it is not necessary that the child be able to view an
image of the defendant.
(h) The court may set any other conditions and limitations on the taking of the
testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the
interests of the child, the rights of the defendant, and any other relevant
facts.
(i) If it is necessary for the child to identify the defendant at trial, the court may
allow the child to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying
the defendant or the court may allow the child to identify the defendant by
observing the defendant's image on a television monitor.
(j) The child's testimony shall be preserved on videotape. The videotape shall
be made a part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order
as provided in section 41(d).
§ 37 Videotaped Deposition
(a) The prosecutor or child's guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a
deposition be taken of the child's testimony and that the deposition be
recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the child's guardian ad litem
applies for an order under this section the guardian ad litem shall consult
with the prosecutor as required in section 36(a).
(b) Upon receipt of an application described in subdivision (a), the court shall
make a finding regarding whether, at the time of trial, the child is likely to
be unable to testify in open court.
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(c) If the court finds pursuant to subdivision (b) that the child is likely to be
unable to testify at trial, the court shall order that the child's deposition be
taken and preserved by videotape.
(d) The court shall preside at the videotape deposition of a child. Objections to
deposition testimony or evidence or parts thereof, and the grounds for the
objection, shall be stated at the time of the taking of the deposition. 242 The
only other persons who may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are:
(1) the prosecutor;
(2) the attorney for the defendant;
(3) the child's guardian ad litem;
(4) persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment;
(5) subject to subdivision (f), the defendant;
(6) other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary
to the welfare and well-being of the child; and
(7) one or both of the child's support persons.
(e) The defendant shall be afforded the rights applicable to defendants during
trial, including the right to an attorney, the right to be confronted with the
child, and the right to cross-examine the child.
(f) If the finding of likely inability to testify under subdivision (b) is based on
evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the
defendant, the court may order that the defendant, including a defendant
representing him or herself, be excluded from the room in which the
deposition is conducted. If the court orders that the defendant be excluded
from the deposition room, the court shall order that live link television
equipment relay the child's image into the room where the defendant is
located, and that the defendant be provided with a means of private,
contemporaneous communication with the defendant's attorney during the
deposition. If the defendant is excluded from the deposition, it is not
necessary that the child be able to view an image of the defendant.
242. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 3511 (b) (1987).
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(g) The complete record of the examination of the child, including the image
and voices of all persons who in any way participate in the examination,
shall be made and preserved on videotape in addition to being
stenographically recorded. The videotape shall be transmitted to the clerk of
the court in which the action is pending and shall be made a part of the
record.
(h) The court may set any other conditions and limitations on the taking of the
deposition that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the
interests of the child, the rights of the defendant, and any other relevant
factors.
(i) The videotape deposition shall be subject to a protective order as provided
in section 41(d).
(j) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a
reason described in section 36(b), or is unavailable for any reason described
in [the rule defining unavailability, for example, Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)], the court may admit into evidence the child's videotaped deposition
in lieu of the child's testimony at the trial. The court shall support a ruling
under this section with findings on the record.
(k) Upon timely receipt of notice that new evidence has been discovered after
the original videotaping and before or during trial, the court, for good cause
shown, may order an additional videotaped deposition. The testimony of the
child shall be restricted to the matters specified by the court as the basis for
granting the order.
§ 38 Videotaped Preliminary Hearing Testimony
(a) The prosecutor may apply at any time for an order that a child's testimony
at a preliminary hearing, in addition to being stenographically recorded, be
videotaped.
(b) Upon timely receipt of the application, the magistrate shall order that the
testimony of the child given at the preliminary hearing be videotaped. The
videotape shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court in which the action is
pending and shall be made a part of the record.
(c) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unavailable to testify
for a reason described in section 36(b), or is unavailable for any reason
described in [the rule defining unavailability, for example, Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a)], the court may admit into evidence the child's videotaped
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preliminary hearing testimony as former testimony. The court shall support
a ruling under this section with findings on the record.
(d) The child's videotaped preliminary hearing testimony shall be made a part
of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as provided in
section 41 (d).
§ 39 Screens and Other Devices to Shield Child from Defendant
(a) The prosecutor or the child's guardian ad litem may apply for an order that
a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom so that the child cannot
see the defendant while the child testifies in the courtroom. Before the
child's guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section the guardian
ad litem shall consult with the prosecutor as required in section 36(a). The
person seeking such an order shall apply for such an order at least 5 days
before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record that the need for an
order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may order that the child be screened from viewing the defendant
as provided in subdivision (a) if the court finds any of the factors listed in
section 36(b).
(c) The court shall support a ruling on screening the child from the defendant
on the record. The court shall consider the factors in section 36(c).
(d) In ruling on an application to shield the child from the defendant during the
child's testimony in the courtroom, the court may question the child as
provided in section 36(d).
(e) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the defendant
during the child's testimony in the courtroom, the court shall arrange the
courtroom so that the defendant can view the child during the child's
testimony.
(f) If the court grants an application made under subdivision (a) the court shall
describe for the record the courtroom arrangement approved by the court.
§ 40 Child Hearsay Exception
(a) A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child
abuse performed with or on the child by another, or describing any act or
attempted act of child abuse witnessed by the declarant child, not otherwise
admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative
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proceeding if:
(1) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) the child either:
(A) testifies at the proceedings; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness: Provided, however, that when the child
is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if
there is corroborative evidence of the act.
(b) A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of
the statement makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the
proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet the statement.
§ 41 Protection of Child's Privacy and Safety
(a) Records Under Seal. Any record regarding a child that is part of the court
record shall be confidential and under seal and shall not be released to
anyone except the following:
(1). members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) the prosecuting attorney;
(3) defense counsel;
(4) the child's guardian ad litem;
(5) agents of investigating law enforcement agencies;
(6) other persons on order of the court.
(b) All Government and Private Agencies to Protect Privacy. Every agency
of state or local government, and every private agency or person that
provides services to children and/or their families shall protect the
confidentiality of records containing the identity of children who are or may
be victims of crime. Children have the right not to have their name, address,
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telephone number, school, photograph, or other identifying information
about them or their families disclosed by any law enforcement agency,
prosecutor's office, state or local government agency, or private agency or
person as defined herein, without the permission of the child if the child is
of sufficient age and maturity to give informed consent to release, or the
child's parent or guardian, to anyone except a law enforcement agency,
prosecutor, defense counsel, guardian ad litem, or private or government
agency or person that provides services to the child.
(c) Identifying Information Deleted. The name, address, telephone number,
school, and other identifying information regarding a child and members of
the child's family shall not appear on any indictment, complaint,
information, pleading, motion, brief, or any other court document or legal
record in the trial courts or appellate courts of this state. In place of the
child's name shall appear initials or a fictitious name.
(d) Protective Order. Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the
court record shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:
PROTECTIVE ORDER
(1) For purposes of this order tape(s) means any videotape or
audiotape of a child.
(2) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel and their
counsel's employees, investigators, and experts for the purpose
of prosecuting or defending this action, and the child's guardian
ad litem.
(3) No tape, or the substance of any portion thereof, shall be
divulged by any person subject to this protective order to any
other person, except as necessary for the trial or preparation for
trial in this proceeding, and such information shall be used only
for purposes of the trial and preparation for trial herein.
(4) No person shall be granted access to the tape, any transcription
thereof, or the substance of any portion thereof unless that
person has first signed an agreement in writing that the person
has received and read a copy of this protective order, that the
-person submits to the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the
protective order, and that the person will be subject to the
Court's contempt powers for any violation of the protective
order.
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(5) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof available to
the parties, their attorneys and respective agents shall bear the
following legend:
THIS OBJECT OR DOCUMENT AND THE CONTENTS
THEREOF ARE SUBJECT TO A PROTECTIVE ORDER
ENTERED BY THE COURT IN STATE V.
• CASE NUMBER . THIS
OBJECT OR DOCUMENT AND THE CONTENTS
THEREOF MAY NOT BE EXAMINED, INSPECTED,
READ, VIEWED, OR COPIED BY ANY PERSON, OR
DISCLOSED TO ANY PERSON, EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED IN THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. ANY
PERSON VIOLATING SUCH PROTECTIVE ORDER IS
SUBJECT TO THE FULL CONTEMPT POWER OF
THE COURT AND MAY BE GUILTY OF A CRIME.
(6) Unless otherwise provided by order of this Court, no additional
copies of the tape or any portion of the tape shall be made
without prior court order.
(7) The tape shall not be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any
person except as provided by this order or by subsequent order
of this Court.
(8) Upon final disposition of this case any and all copies of the tape
and any transcripts thereof shall be returned to the Court for
safekeeping, except those tapes booked into and kept as
evidence by the investigating law enforcement agencies. Those
materials subject to this order so kept by any law enforcement
agency shall remain subject to this order and those materials
shall remain secured in evidence in accordance with the
agency's policies and procedures.
(9) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until
further order of this Court.
(e) Additional Protective Orders. The court may, on its own motion, or on the
motion of any party, the child, the child's parents or guardian, or the child's
guardian ad litem, enter any protective orders needed to protect the child's
privacy in addition to the protective order required by subdivision (d). A
protective order may protect any record on a child.
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(f) Publication of Identity Unlawful. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published in any format the name, address, phone number, school, or other
identifying information of a child who is or is alleged to be a victim of
crime, or a member of the child's family, or who violates the protective
order set forth in subdivision (d) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(g) Physical Safety of Child; Exclusion of Evidence. A child has a right at any
court proceeding not to testify regarding personal identifying information
including the child's name, address, telephone number, school, and other
information that could lead to the whereabouts of the child or the child's
family. The court may require the child to testify regarding personal
identifying information that is required to be disclosed in the interest of
justice.
(h) Unauthorized Release Does Not Bar Prosecution. Any release of
information in violation of this section does not bar prosecution or other
legal action or provide grounds for dismissal of charges.
(i) Destruction of Videotapes and Audiotapes. Any videotape or audiotape
of a child produced under the provisions of this Code or otherwise made part
of the court record shall be destroyed after five years have elapsed from the
date of entry of judgment or other disposition; Provided, however, that if an
appeal is filed, the tape shall not be destroyed until a final judgment on
appeal has been rendered.
(j) Disclosure of Defendant's Name. The name of the defendant shall be
available as part of the record to the extet permitted by law whether or not
the defendant is a member of a child victim's family.
§ 42 Multidisciplinary Team Investigation; Interviewing
(a) Every county, or combination of counties, in the state shall create and
maintain one or more multidisciplinary teams to investigate child abuse and
interview children who witness abuse or who may be victims of abuse.
(b) Every county, or combination of counties, in the state, in conjunction with
appropriate state, local, and private agencies, shall provide ongoing training
to professionals who interview children. Training shall be provided to multi-
disciplinary teams and other professionals who interview children.
(c) Whenever it is necessary to interview a child regarding possible child abuse,
efforts shall be made to have the child interviewed by a professional with
training and experience interviewing children.
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§ 43 Videotaping and Audiotaping Investigative Interviews
(a) Whenever child abuse is suspected and a child is interviewed by a member
of a multidisciplinary team or a representative of law enforcement or child
protective services, the interview shall be videotaped unless exigent
circumstances render videotaping extremely difficult or impossible. If an
interview is not videotaped, the interview shall be audiotaped unless
audiotaping is impossible due to lack of proper equipment or an emergency.
(b) The requirements of this section regarding videotaping and audiotaping
pertain to in-depth investigative interviews, commonly called disclosure
interviews, where the goal of questioning is to determine whether child
abuse occurred. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require
videotaping or audiotaping of brief field contacts between children and
representatives of law enforcement or child protective services that do not
constitute in-depth investigative interviews.
(c) The fact that an investigative interview is or is not videotaped or audiotaped
may be considered in determining the reliability of a child's statements
describing abuse.
(d) The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as
required by this section shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from
evidence a child's out-of-court statements or testimony.
§ 44 Corroboration of Children's Testimony
Except as provided in section 40(a)(2)(B) of this Code, corroboration shall not
be required of a child's testimony, and a child's testimony, if believed, shall be
sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or verdict.
§ 45 Jury Instruction Regarding Child Witness
In any proceeding in which a child testifies as a witness, upon the request of a
party, the court shall instruct the jury, as follows:
In evaluating the testimony of a child you should consider all of the
factors surrounding the child's testimony, including the age of the
child and any evidence regarding the child's level of cognitive
development. Although, because of age and level of cognitive
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development, a child may perform differently as a witness than an
adult, that does not mean that a child is any more or less credible a
witness than an adult. You should not discount or distrust the
testimony of a child solely because the witness is a child.
243
§ 46 Severability
If any provision of this Child Witness Code or its application to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Code or the application of the
provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.
243. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1127F (West 1995).

